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1. Introduction 
Ten years after the start of the war in Iraq the country is still divided and haunted by 
ethnic violence. Iraq has not only been experiencing terrorism in relation to anti-
American insurgency, but also sectarian strife among Shia and Sunni militias, and in 
relation to the conflict between Arabs and Kurds mainly in northern Iraq (Kalyvas & 
Kocher, 2007). The UN Iraq mission reports that April 2013 was the deadliest month in 
the country since June 2008, with 712 fatalities and 1.633 injured. The upsurge in 
terrorist activity is related to al-Qaeda in Iraq and other Sunni based insurgency groups 
which have conducted attacks on a daily basis to undermine the power of the Shia-led 
government and to provoke confrontation1. It seems evident that these problems are 
connected to the government’s inability to solve the power sharing structures among 
the three major ethnic groups; Shia, Sunni and Kurds2.  Although the death-tolls are high 
and the implications for national and regional security are severe, this kind of ethno-
nationalist domestic terrorism does not get nearly as much attention as its “more 
spectacular” counterparts. The terrorist actions in Oslo 22 July 2011, the hostage 
situation in In Amenas January 2013 and the recent bombings in Boston are only a few 
examples of terrorist activity which have been given large media attention in the last 
couple of years. These attacks put terrorism on the agenda for politicians, commentators 
and policymakers, but the overwhelming focus on these events only give us one picture 
of the highly complex terrorist phenomenon.   
After the terrorist attacks on September 11 2011 (henceforth 9/11) the research on 
terrorism has expanded immensely, focus on case-studies of terrorist organizations and 
specific countries experiencing terrorism. In later years researchers have also to a larger 
degree employed quantitative techniques to explain the roots of terrorism, to provide 
knowledge on a general basis of what motivates terrorist organizations. But even though 
there has been much research and large funding from states and research agencies, 
there seems to be a lack of agreement on the roots causes of terrorism. One of the 
                                                        
1http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/april-deadliest-month-iraq-june-2008-u-n-article-
1.1334172?localLinksEnabled=false 
2My definition of ethnicity throughout this thesis follows that of Cederman et al. (2010:2): “any 
subjectively experienced sense of commonality based on a belief in common ancestry and shared culture. 
Different markers may be used to indicate such shared ancestry and culture: common language, similar 
phonotypical features, adherence to the same faith”. Thus my notion of ethnicity also includes different 
religious groups. 
2 
 
reasons for this is the complex and widely different motivations of the groups ranging 
from ethno-nationalist sentiments to right-wing extremism.  
Keeping in mind that terrorism is a complex phenomenon, I start out by examining two 
aspects of the terrorist activity: namely how ethnic identity and inequality are connected 
to terrorism.  Generally the ethnicity aspect has not gotten that much attention in large- 
N quantitative studies of terrorism. Although there are some evidence from case-studies 
indicating that unequal treatment of marginalized groups play an important role in 
explaining terrorism (Ergil, 2000; Van de Voorde, 2005; Bradly, 2006; Derin-Grue, 
2011), except for recent studies by Piazza (2011; 2012) the status of ethnic groups has 
been overlooked in studies of the root causes of terrorism.  
The starting point of this thesis is to fill the gap between empirical case-study evidence 
on terrorism, and empirical results from the study of civil war and terrorism- indicating 
that inequality along different dimensions is of great importance in explaining political 
violence. Previous quantitative studies of terrorism have only tested inequalities at the 
individual level, and country-level variations in individual inequality. My notion of 
inequality goes beyond individual economic inequality, and rather focuses on inequality 
between groups. This is mainly because terrorism is largely seen as a group 
phenomenon (with some exceptions, like Breivik in Norway). Horizontal inequality is, 
among others, proposed by Frances Stewart (2002; 2008; 2009), and describes 
inequalities in four dimensions; social, economic, political and cultural.  The theory 
specifically points to group factors as a main motivation for political violence. This 
generates my general research question:  
Countries with groups facing strong horizontal inequalities have higher probability 
of experiencing terrorism than more egalitarian countries. 
In this thesis I take a specific look at ethno-nationalist terrorism, and factors connected 
to this specific sub-type of terrorism. The analysis will be conducted at the country- and 
group-level. The county-level analysis tests how horizontal inequalities affect rates and 
probability of domestic terrorism on a general basis. Further the new disaggregated 
group-level approach makes me able to test the causal-mechanism between horizontal 
inequalities and ethno-nationalist terrorism directly. To my knowledge this is the first 
truly global attempt to code and locate terrorist groups and connect this to 
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geographically defined ethnic groups. My analysis is thus the first quantitative study of 
group-level mechanisms and terrorism. 
To make this analysis possible I have coded and gathered information from the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD) and combined this with information on ethnic groups from 
the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (EPR). The new data provides the opportunity to 
look specifically at ethno-nationalist terrorism. Following this, my thesis contributes to 
the study of terrorism in several ways. First, the thesis provides new disaggregated data 
on ethno-nationalist terrorism. Second, I am making use of specific theories apt to 
explain the group-dynamics of ethno-nationalist terrorism (horizontal inequalities). 
Third, the new data-material makes it possible to test variables describing 
geographically based ethnic groups, and variables measuring their economic and 
political status directly. 
The thesis is structured as follows, in Chapter 2 I am defining terrorism and describing 
the differences between terrorism and other types of political violence. Thereafter, 
because of the complex nature of terrorist phenomenon I introduce some of the main 
hypotheses put forward in the literature and the main findings.  At the end of Chapter 2 I 
am pointing out methodological and conceptual challenges which I deem important, and 
possible ways forward.  
In Chapter 3 I introduce the theoretical framework of the thesis, namely horizontal 
inequalities. Based on literature on identity formation, and mobilization theories I am 
connecting these structural inequalities specifically to ethno-nationalist terrorism. At 
the end of the chapter I put forward my hypotheses derived from my general research 
question and the theoretical discussion. Chapter 4 depicts the research design of this 
thesis, which is of a quantitative nature. The chapter includes a detailed description of 
my work on coding terrorist organizations, ascribing these with an ethnic identity, and 
possible limitations to this approach. I also describe data, the variables being used and 
the statistical methods applied.  
Chapter 5 introduces my analysis. Here I test my hypotheses using different 
operationalizations of the dependent variable at both country- and group-level. Because 
of the nature of my dependent variables I am using two different statistical methods. At 
the end I summarize my main findings from the analysis. Further, Chapter 6 summarizes 
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and gives a conclusion. I describe the contribution of my research, as well as some of the 
challenges. I also present some policy recommendations and possibilities for future 
research.  
The main finding of my thesis is that throughout different operationalizations political 
horizontal inequality is a strong predictor of terrorism. Additionally I find some support 
for economic horizontal inequality, although the results are not as robust as for the 
political exclusion hypothesis. Northern Ireland provides a good example of how both 
political and economic horizontal inequalities may have been a crucial factor in 
producing ethno-nationalist terrorism. But even though my analyses focus on ethno-
nationalist terrorism it is reasonable to expect that these results can be generalized to 
other types of terrorism, such as ideological terrorism, and that the unequal treatment 
of groups generally leads to mobilization for different types of terrorism.   
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2.  Definitions and literature review 
This chapter discusses different definitions of terrorism and how it differentiates from 
other types of political violence. It includes a summary of different hypotheses and 
findings from the research field.  At the end there is a discussion on some potential 
problems in the current state of the literature.  
2.1 Defining terrorism 
The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for which 
each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation 
of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists, cannot possibly be called a 
terrorist, otherwise the American people in their struggle for liberation from the British 
colonialists would have been terrorists. 
The quotation is from Yasser Arafat’s3 speech to the UN General Assembly in 1974, and 
shows the great difficulty researchers of terrorism meet when trying to define terrorism, 
where “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”. The perception of 
terrorism may be different from country to country, and for different groups and 
individuals. The hostage situation in In Amenas (Algeria) in January 2013 has shown us 
that the links between the foreign policy of states, internal rivalries, ethnic boundaries   
and contagion is a large part of the terrorist phenomenon. The terrorist actions in 
Algeria show a complicated picture of how difficult it is to investigate the root causes of 
terrorism, as the mechanisms that produce opportunities; frustration and mobilization 
are manifold and deeply intertwined4. Although groups generally have widely different 
reasons for using terrorism, most scholars agree on the definition proposed by Bruce 
Hoffman (2006) that terrorism is:  
…the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of 
violence in the pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat 
                                                        
3 Yasser Arafat leader of the PLO in Palestine. Speech from: http://www.monde-
diplomatique.fr/cahier/proche-orient/arafat74-en. 
4 Both regional and transnational factors are involved, and the attack directly follows from a series of 
Tuareg uprisings in Mali, leading to French intervention in the country (Parks, 2013). Parks (2013) calls 
the phenomenon “trans-regional Jihadism”, where the event was planned in Mali, launched from Libya, 
and executed in Algeria.  
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of violence. Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects 
beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instill fear 
within, and thereby intimidate a wider “target audience” that might include a rival ethnic 
group or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party, or 
public opinion in general  (Hoffman, 2006: 40-1). 
A violent action is not regarded as a terrorist attack unless it has a political or social 
motive, thus a drive-by–shooting in a city street is not a terrorist action. Therefore 
terrorist actions are not random; they are executed and planned, and the terrorists do 
account for risks, gains and the costs that are affiliated with the attacks (Enders & 
Sandler, 2005). 
2.1.1  Ethno-nationalist terrorism 
Ethnic terrorism can be defined as the deliberate violence by a sub national ethnic group 
to advance its cause. Such violence usually focuses on the creation of a separate state or 
on the elevation of the status of one communal group over others. Designed to foster 
identity as well as to advance standard political goals, ethnic terrorism is often directed 
against symbolic targets. Unlike other terrorists ethnic terrorists often have a built-in 
audience among their own communal group. Ethnic terrorism bears many similarities to 
guerrilla conflict. In fact, it is often seen by its practitioners as part of a proto-guerilla 
movement (Byman, 1998: 151). 
Ethno-nationalist terrorism usually focuses on the creation of a state, or the 
enhancement of a groups’ status. Therefore ethno-nationalist terrorism often includes 
some sort of separatist goal. For instance the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) has 
conducted terrorist campaigns since the mid-1980s, mainly in the south-eastern region 
of Turkey, and their goal is to establish an independent Kurdistan (Reinares, 2005;121). 
Byman (1998:151) expresses the difference between revolutionary and ethno-
nationalist terrorism; “Any believer can join the Shining Path, but non-Tamils would find 
it hard to join the LTTE” 5.  Some examples of ethno-national terrorism is the Tamils Sri 
                                                        
5 The categorization of terrorist groups is somewhat problematic, but we can divide the motivations into 
several different categories (Masters, 2008).  Different types of terrorism vary from ethno-nationalist to 
more ideological (e.g. revolutionary/ leftist) terrorism. On the one hand revolutionary terrorists ultimate 
goal is regime change trough a popular uprising, or more specifically aim to “destruct 
capitalism”(Sànches-Cuenca, 2009). The revolutionary terrorist organizations often used Marxist jargon to 
mobilize followers, and their actions seldom led to killing people. For example the Angry Brigade in Great 
Britain attacks “property, not people” (Sànches-Cuenca, 2009:689). 
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Lanka (LTTE), the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army’s (SPLA’s) struggle against the 
Muslim majority in the north of Sudan6, and the Palestinians also apply different 
terrorist tactics (Enders & Sandler, 2005:8).  Further Byman (1998) emphasize that the 
motivations for some ethno-nationalist groups’ evolve over time: 
Some groups, of coerce, evolve from one type to another. Hezballah, for example, started 
as a religious movement seeking to turn Lebanon into an Islamic state. In recent years, 
however, Hezballah has increasingly pursued communal goals. Today, Hezballah 
primarily seeks to advance the agenda of Lebanese Shi’a community (and to a lesser 
extent Shi’a worldwide) rather than a particular religious tenet. Hezballah retains its 
pan-Islamic ideology, but its ideological goals are subordinated to more practical 
concernes of the Lebanese Shi’a community (Byman, 1998: 151-152).  
2.1.2 Terrorism and political violence   
Another definitional challenge affects distinguishing terrorism from warfare.  Enders 
and Sandler (2005) describe the distinction as:  
In its classic sense, war targets combatants with weapons that are highly discriminating 
in order to limit collateral damage on civilians. Unlike war, terrorism targets 
noncombatants in a relatively indiscriminate manner (Enders & Sandler, 2005: 6). 
What distinguish terrorism from other forms of political violence is thus the difference 
between target and victim (Findley & Young, 2011:415). Other forms of political 
violence, such as civil war, (mainly) do not have the same disparity. But although there 
are clear differences between civil war and terrorism, the two are often intertwined.  
One example of a terrorist group operating in a setting of civil war is the Shining Path in 
Peru. The group was active in the 1980s and 1990s, and used extreme measures to keep 
coherence in the group. Their tactics were to use violence against civilians to keep the 
larger population on their side and then attack the state (Findley & Young, 2012:285). 
Bjørgo (2005) emphasize that terrorism often is a radicalization of various types of 
conflict, frequently between different ethnic minorities, ideological groups and the 
                                                        
6 Some ethno-nationalist terrorist groups have religious elements, but the main motivation may not lie in 
the religion per se. Especially in the years after 9/11 there has been a large focus on the religious aspect of 
terrorism, and thus specifically on the brutality of “Islamic terrorism”. This has been called the fourth 
wave of terrorism, arguing that we now have a “new wave” which is highly religious and more lethal than 
previous types of terrorism. See Rapaport (2004) for more on the “new wave” of terrorism. 
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government. He emphasizes that the roots of these types of conflicts also (often) are the 
same as those for terrorism, but it is also worth noting that many conflicts do not lead to 
the use of terrorism (Bjørgo, 2005: 4).  
The University of Uppsala provides a large amount of data on one-sided violence, inter-
state war and intra-state war. The definition of an intra-state conflict from the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (henceforth UCDP)7 is that the war is between the state at the one 
hand and a non-governmental organization on the other (with at least 25 dead due to 
battle in a year). To be regarded as a civil war there needs to be at least a thousand 
battle related deaths in a year. So given the event that terrorist actions do result in more 
than 25 casualties in a year (or a thousand), the terrorist action is coded in the UCDP 
dataset. To describe the difficulty with the analytical distinction of political violence and 
terrorism: 
In terms of the targeting of civilians the UCDP’s category of “one-sided violence” often 
overlaps with definitions of terrorism with a lethal outcome. Any actor directly targeting 
and killing civilians are perpetrating one-sided violence. This includes also governments 
of states; a type of actor that according to many definitions of terrorism cannot be 
“terrorists” (UCDP, 2003).  
This may make one wonder how different the division of the two types of violence really 
is, at least according to some definitions. The attacks in Norway on the 22 July 2011 
would have been coded as one-sided violence in the UCDP had Anders Behring Breivik 
been part of an organized group, because the attack was directed at the government 
district (e.g. the state). On the other hand the attacks against the US on 9/11 are coded in 
two ways in the UCDP dataset: 
As an example one can look at the events of 9/11. Three planes crashed into building in 
the USA; two into the World Trade Center and one into the Pentagon. The two planes 
flying into the World Trade Center are viewed as being acts of one-sided violence, since 
the World Trade Center is not a military target or a representation of the government of 
the USA. The third plane, which crashed into the Pentagon, is, however, coded as state-
based violence as the Pentagon is a military installation (UCDP, 2013).  
                                                        
7 For UCDPs definitions and datasets see: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/.  
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These examples tell us that the line between political violence and terrorism may not be 
that different after all (e.g. Boyle, 2012). Following this it seems plausible that the 
factors of terrorism and civil war/conflict may be the same, for example the theoretical 
framework used to explain why groups use terrorism as a tactic to reach their goals, as 
pointed out by Lia (2005:12): 
To study terrorism in isolation from the larger body of political-violence and civil-war 
studies is problematic. Terrorism and armed conflict is closely linked, and the causalities 
explaining variations in civil war may also help us in understanding the causes of 
terrorism. 
2.1.3 Transnational vs. domestic terrorism  
As we have seen terrorism is a complex and highly diverse phenomenon, but there is a 
main division between domestic and transnational terrorism8. The latter is terrorism 
which includes different nationalities, and research on the subject often divides between 
origin and target country (Enders & Sandler, 2005; Krieger & Meierricks, 2011). 
Domestic terrorism is on the other hand a homegrown phenomenon, and its effects are 
mostly visible in the host county. Domestic terrorism effects property, citizens, 
institutions and national politics (Enders & Sandler, 2005). Ethno-nationalist conflicts 
(e.g. Basques in Spain) are mostly connected to domestic terrorist attacks9. What is 
important to mention is that domestic attacks outnumber the transnational counterpart, 
and there are about eight times as many domestic terrorist events (Enders & Sandler, 
2008).  
Despite this being the case, domestic terrorism attract far less interest from the media 
and scholars. One reason why this type of terrorism has been given more limited 
attention from scholars is the nature of the phenomenon. Domestic terrorist events 
usually receive less international media coverage, because it is a mechanism to express 
discontent with domestic conditions (Schneider et al., 2009).  This has made information 
                                                        
8 Another type of terrorism that will not be discussed further in this thesis is state terrorism. This is in 
cases where the state itself uses terrorist tactics against its own citizens (e.g. Stalins reign of terror). 
Although the tactics are sometimes the same, my definition of terrorism only includes perpetrators that 
are subgroups or individuals, and thus state terrorism by definition falls out of the equation (Enders & 
Sandler, 2005:4).  
9  Although the rebels may want to publicize their grievances or wishes to the rest of the world, and 
therefore engage in attacks in other countries, e.g  the PLO (Enders & Sandler, 2005).  
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on the subject less available, but the lack of information has to a large extent vanished 
with the spread of internet. 
2.2  Previous research on terrorism   
In this section I will introduce some quantitative empirical findings from the growing 
literature on terrorism. This shows the vast array of different understandings and 
theoretical perspectives that is used to describe the phenomenon. Most studies of 
terrorism rely on transnational terrorism, relying on data describing origin and target 
country. The articles include a large amount of variables, model specifications and 
hypotheses, and test many sides of the phenomenon. As the nature of my research 
question proposes factors of the origin country to be of specific importance, the studies 
described here look at specific factors of the origin country of transnational terrorism.  
This is because it is probable that the structural factors also apply when looking more 
specifically at home-grown domestic terrorism10. Some of the newer studies do 
distinguish between domestic and transnational terrorism, and these will also be 
presented in this survey.  The review will rely on six different factors/hypotheses 
presented in different peer reviewed articles and book chapters investigating the root 
causes of terrorism. These are contagion, modernization-strain, transformation and 
political stability, political and institutional factors, identity and economic deprivation11.  
Contagion 
The contagion hypothesis refers to terrorism as a phenomenon which is produced by 
spatial and temporal spillover effects from neighboring states, “the main idea is that 
terrorism exhibits a strong self-energizing nature with respect to both time and space” 
(Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011:8). Countries in a region with neighboring conflicts, civil 
wars or neighbors which experience high levels of terrorism, are more prone to 
experience terrorism in their own land (e.g. by groups cooperating by sharing knowhow 
over the borders) (Schneider et al., 2009). Plümper & Neumayer (2010) found in their 
                                                        
10 This is also noted by Findley& Young (2011) but it is also of great importance to emphasize that the 
causal-mechanisms may not be the same. 
11 Note that the studies may not be directly comparable as they use different timeframes and data- 
sources. It is also worth noting that many of the hypotheses are clearly connected, and may be 
overlapping. This is also noticed by Krieger & Meierrieks (2011).  
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analysis of international terrorism in the years 1970-2005 that countries close to 
unstable countries (e.g. countries in civil war or high levels of terrorism) would have 
increased risk of experiencing terrorism. Using Geographical information system (GIS) 
Berrebi & Lakdawalla (2007) found that terrorism was more likely in areas closer to 
international borders and in areas close to terrorist bases. They found that location is a 
main motivational factor for attacks. There is also reason to believe that there is a 
temporal dependence in terrorism, whereas countries often experience terrorism over 
and over again. Lai (2007) and Enders & Sandler (2005) find a positive effect between 
levels of terrorism and previous terrorist activity in the country.  
Modernization  
Modernization and the strains connected to globalization are hypothesized to have an 
impact on the occurrence of terrorism. With a rational-actor perspective Li & Shaub 
(2004) look at globalization and factors connected to economic integration. Their 
analysis shows that economic development gives less incidents of terrorism in the origin 
country (through e.g. attacks on embassies) (Li & Shaub, 2004:232). Lai (2007) looks at 
origin countries and concur with what is found in regards to economic climate. Good 
economic conditions make it less advantageous to use terrorism. This is measured with 
GDP growth, and countries with higher GDP growth seem to have less terrorism. 
Looking at a short time-span (1997-2004), Bravo & Dias (2006) find that countries in 
Eurasia with lower economic growth, non-democracies, with low literacy levels and less 
dependence on trade experience higher levels of terrorism.12 Following in the same 
rational actor perspective Freytag et al. (2011) investigate domestic terrorism in 110 
countries from 1971-2007. From their analysis they conclude that improvements in 
countries economic conditions can help increase the opportunity costs of terrorism, and 
thus give less terrorist incidents (Freytag et al., 2011; 14). The proxies for “strain” 
factors are highly debatable, as growth in GDP may not be directly connected to 
“modernization” as such13. 
                                                        
12 Bravos & Dias (2006) do not explicitly look at domestic or transnational terrorism but rather data on 
total terrorist attacks for the period, the same goes for Burgoon (2006).   
13 Another hypothesis is the global political and economic order. This relates to international factors also 
plays part in the creation of terrorism (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011). High economic integration and trade 
openness has been found to be negatively correlated to production of terrorism (c.f. Kurrild & Klitgard, 
2006). Not surprisingly, being part of an international war seems to produce more terrorism (Lai, 2007). 
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Political transformation and stability 
For scholars investigating this hypothesis, political transformation and stability of a 
society is the main drivers for groups turning to terrorist tactics. State failure is an 
important factor, and countries which are in a transitional period are more prone to 
experiencing high levels of terrorism, either being produced there (transnational 
terrorism) or being vulnerable for attacks on their own land (domestic incidents). 
Transitions in political systems create a political vacuum that increases the incentives of 
individuals in joining terrorist organizations, rather than conventional channels for 
political participation (Schneider et al., 2009; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011).  Examples of 
such an increase in terrorism in a transnational period can be found in Spain, where the 
transition from an autocratic to a democratic regime was followed by a growth in 
terrorism (Abadie, 2004).  Abadie (2004) finds that political freedom is the most salient 
variable, and that intermediate levels of political freedom is significantly correlated with 
terrorism. The results seem to indicate that there exists a converted u-curve in regards 
to terrorism, where transitional periods are accompanied with an increase in terrorist 
activity. Findley & Young (2011) also concur with this in their cross-country analysis of 
domestic terrorism. Countries in transitional periods (semi-democracies) experience 
higher levels of domestic terrorism than their democratic and autocratic counterparts. 
Their sensitivity analysis also reveals that this is evident when studying transnational 
terrorism as well (Young & Findley, 2011).  
Specifically looking at civil war and terrorism (as discussed in Section 2.1.2), Lai (2007) 
finds that countries which experience civil war (and thus instability) is more likely to 
produce higher levels of terrorism. Further using geo-referenced data, Findley and 
Young (2012) are able to look closely at the link between the two phenomena. Their 
results show that “most incidents of terrorism take place in the geographic regions 
where civil war is occurring and during the ongoing war” (Findley & Young, 2012:286). 
This gives evidence to the fact that terrorism may be one of the rebel group tactics in a 
civil war (or a civil conflict).  
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Political and institutional factors 
Rather than looking at the transformation and stability of the political system (seen in 
the previous section), the political and institutional factors hypothesis is related to the 
inherent factors of democracy (e.g. democratic peace). The political “access” school 
proposes that higher levels of democracy results in less terrorism, because democracy 
has some inherent “conflict reducing mechanisms”. These mechanisms help people 
address their grievances through conventional channels of participation. On the other 
hand, the “strategic” school of the democracy-terrorism nexus proposes that terrorism 
encourages terrorism through civil liberties, and thus that democracies are enabling 
terrorism (Drakos & Gofas, 2006a).  
When looking at the origin country of transnational terrorism democracy is found to be 
a negative predictor (Eyerman, 1998; Krugler & Lantin, 2006; Krueger & Maleckova, 
2003; Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2006; Shaun & Phillips, 2009), thus giving more support to the 
access school of democracy14. Li (2005) finds that political participation has a negative 
effect on the levels of terrorism, while executive constraints are related to higher levels 
of terrorism. The results suggest that different parts of the democratic system promote 
terrorism. Piazza (2011) uses the same differentiation between political participation 
and executive constraints in his analysis of domestic terrorism; he finds that both are 
negative predictors of domestic terrorism. The results provide more evidence for the 
belief that the causal mechanisms are different for domestic and transnational 
terrorism15. 
Another factor relating to institutional and political factors is welfare policies. Burgoon 
(2006) finds that countries with more generous welfare systems are likely to experience 
fewer terrorist attacks. He proposes that even the least developed countries will be 
better off with more social policies, and health services (Burgoon, 2006:179-80). 
Following in Burgoon’s footsteps Kriegler & Meierrieks (2010) look at different sides of 
fifteen Western European welfare states from 1980 to 2003. Based on different social 
                                                        
14 When looking at target country for international terrorism, democracy seems to be a strong predictor 
(Blomberg & Hess, 2008; Li & Shaub, 2004; Li, 2005; Lai, 2007). This may have a natural explanation in 
regards to the “foreign policy” of democratic states, and thus more in common with the global order 
hypothesis.  
15 It is important to notice that the effect of democracy may stem from biased data material, where the 
openness of media in democracies makes the rates higher, while autocracies do not have the same press 
freedom, and thus fewer attacks are being reported (Drakos & Gofas, 2006a). 
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policy indicators, such as unemployment benefits, labor-market programs and health 
services, they find welfare policies to be a negative predictor of homegrown terrorism. 
The same pattern is not present when looking at transnational terrorism, and thus 
welfare policies only seem to have impact on domestic terrorism. Krieger & Meierrieks 
(2010:930) suggest that; “our analysis thus sides with other contributions that 
emphasize the importance of raising the opportunity costs of terrorists instead of 
relying on hard-line counter-terrorism strategies”. 
Yet another aspect of the institutional conditions is education. Brockhoff et al. (2012) 
focus on the impact of education on terrorism, and they find that education may actually 
promote terrorism in countries where the socio-economic conditions are not stable. 
They also find that education must be combined with efforts to better the issues in 
relation to poverty, inequality, discrimination and economic growth. They emphasize 
that “education can only be expected to have a beneficial (terrorism-reducing) effect 
when country-specific conditions are favorable” (Brockhoff et al., 2012:29). 
Identity factors 
As mentioned earlier (in Section 2.1.1), different identities can potentially be an 
important factor for terrorism. It is a highly relevant hypothesis which proposes that 
ethnic or religious identity is especially important when we wish to explain why 
terrorism occurs. This hypothesis can on the one hand, be viewed as a factor on its own, 
where terrorism is more likely between different identities or across civilizational lines 
(cf. Huntington, 1993). On the other hand, it can be interpreted more as a necessary 
precondition for mobilization for terrorism. Usually studies of terrorism only include 
identity indicators or ethnic factors as control variables in the statistical analysis16. 
Looking at the origin country of terrorism, Piazza (2006) finds that ethnically-and 
religiously diverse societies have a higher likelihood of terrorism and that these factors 
are more salient than variables measuring economic factors. While Piazza’s analysis 
seems to give support to the ethnicity-terrorism argument, others have not found this 
connection. Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006) can only find a weak positive link between 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization and terrorism. Krueger & Laitin (2008) do not seem to 
                                                        
16 Engene (2007) uses the TWEED dataset (measuring domestic terrorism in Western Europe).He finds 
that about 80 per cent of the events are connected to ethno-nationalist terrorism. 
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find any significant positive relationship between ethno-linguistic fractionalization at all, 
and goes far in dismissing the hypothesis. But in agreement with Piazza’s (2006) results, 
Basuchoudhary & Shughart (2010) look at the origin state where the transnational 
terrorism stems from. They find that transnational terrorism is more likely to originate 
in states which are more ethnically tense, and the ethnicity aspect also holds when 
controlling for institutional factors.  As mentioned, these studies have in large part used 
ethnic indicators as control variables, and the different variables may also have its 
weaknesses17.  
Trying to overcome the gap in the literature, Piazza (2011) is one of the first who looks 
at the factors producing domestic terrorism in regard to poverty and discriminated 
minority groups. He is using variables gathered from the Minorities at Risk project 
(MAR) and he conducts a cross-national analysis of domestic terrorism, with emphasis 
on differences between ethnic groups (and discrimination). Piazza suggests that the 
study offers two main conclusions. First, that discrimination is a crucial factor in 
explaining domestic terrorism, and that countries which “permit their minority 
communities to be afflicted by economic discrimination make themselves more 
vulnerable to domestic terrorism” (Piazza, 2011:350). Second, he concludes that while 
aggregate levels of poverty do affect domestic terrorism, this has a smaller effect than a 
minority group`s economic status (Piazza, 2011:350). This seems to suggest that the link 
between ethnicity and terrorism is especially strong, and that the economic and political 
status of the different ethnic groups may explain more of the cross-country variation in 
terrorism.  
Building on his previous work Piazza (2012) expands the analysis to both domestic and 
transnational terrorism. The analysis also includes variables which measure minority 
discrimination along different dimensions, such as, political, economic, religious and 
linguistic. Then, looking more closely at the different factors in the minorities’ 
positions18, he finds that countries with economically discriminated minority groups 
have higher levels of terrorism; this includes both counts of domestic and transnational 
terrorism. He finds that ethno-political grievance, or in this regard political 
discrimination, matter less than the minority economic discrimination variable.  
                                                        
17 I will return to the problems with the ethnicity variables in section 2.3.1. 
18  All analyses are done using variables from the MAR-dataset.  
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Economic deprivation 
We fight against poverty, because hope is an answer to terror19. 
The notion that terrorism stems from economic underdevelopment and poverty is a 
popular belief among many policy makers and commentators. Although there are many 
arguments of how and why socio-economic conditions are connected to terrorism, the 
“Rooted-in-poverty” (relative deprivation) hypothesis is the most controversial.   
Rather than focusing on the economic growth factors connected to modernization, the 
economic deprivation hypothesis proposes that poverty and inequality lead to 
terrorism, because there is a discrepancy between what people get and what they feel 
like they deserve (e.g. Gurr, 1970).  This deprivation is in the quantitative literature 
largely connected to individual circumstances, and to poverty. Case-studies have 
provided evidence that there is a positive relationship between discriminated groups, 
poverty/inequality and terrorism (Ergil, 2000; Van de Voorde, 2005; Bradly, 2006; 
Derin-Grue, 2011). Although the case-based knowledge shows a positive relationship 
between relative economic deprivation and terrorism, the large-N studies of terrorism 
are not as confirmative.   
In one of the first time-series analyses of terrorism, Thompson (1989) looks at relative 
deprivation theory explicitly and hypothesizes this as a motivating factor for terrorism 
in Northern-Ireland in the period 1922 to 1985.  The analysis do not provide evidence of 
a positive connection between terrorism and relative deprivation, using levels of 
unemployment as a proxy for deprivation, although Northern Ireland experienced high 
levels of unemployment in the period.  Newer cross-country analyses have found some 
evidence that poverty to some extent increases the levels of terrorism. Bloomberg and 
Hess (2008) and Lai (2007) find that higher levels of GDP per capita reduce the 
likelihood of terrorism, and that this in turn provides evidence of the “rooted-in 
poverty” hypothesis.  Caruso and Schneider (2011) finds for Western Europe that larger 
economic opportunities (using GDP per capita) lower the likelihood of terrorism. Abadie 
(2004) do not find the same results in regard to poverty, and emphasizes that the effect 
of poverty disappears when controlling for other political and social characteristics. 
                                                        
19 George W Bush (2002) speech at the United Nation financing for development  
confrence in Monterry, Mexico. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/march02/bush_3-22.html 
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Piazza (2006) sets out to investigate poverty, socio-economic factors and terrorism. The 
variables that had most effect were the population size, ethno-religious diversity, state 
repression and the structure of the political system.  Piazza concludes that the social 
divisions are more salient than variables connected to poverty (and economic factors) 
and thus gives no support for the deprivation hypothesis (that poverty breeds 
terrorism).  
The above mentioned studies show that it is hard to establish a direct connection 
between economic factors, poverty and terrorism. In a fairly new paper Enders & 
Hoover (2012) investigates the connection between terrorism and poverty, and they 
find a strong nonlinear relationship using data on both transnational and domestic 
terrorism. They also find that countries with high levels of economic inequality will have 
high levels of terrorism. Their analysis shows that there is a threshold of about 1000 
dollars when looking at domestic terrorism. As a country reaches this threshold, 
domestic terrorism seems to decline. But if the development is followed by higher levels 
of economic inequality, this could lead to higher levels of domestic terrorism (Enders & 
Hoover, 2012:11-12). This study supports the notion of an economic deprivation effect 
that follows inequality in a country. It is also important to notice that Enders & Hoover 
uses the GINI-coefficient, measuring the distribution of wealth between individuals in a 
country.  
Rather than focusing on aggregated factors, the individual level makes it possible to test 
the individual motivations for engaging in terrorism directly. Krueger & Maleckova 
(2003) and Krueger (2007) dispute the argument that poverty is directly connected to 
terrorism. They emphasize the indirect effect of economy and poverty as a cause of 
terrorism. Economic deprivation at the individual level may not be connected to 
terrorism; although they emphasize that there might be a connection at the national 
level. 
One reason is that we tend to see the world trough materialistic Western eyes, viewing 
economic circumstances as powerful motivations for belief and action. In addition 
assuming that those who attack us do so because they are desperate or because they hate 
our way of life provides a reassuringly simple answer to a disturbingly complex question 
(Krueger, 2007: 50). 
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In the case that a country is economically impoverished, this may lead a minority of 
relatively well off people to use terrorism as a means to improve the conditions of their 
countrymen (Krueger and Malekova, 2003:30), Krueger (2007) describes the 
phenomenon as: “the Robin-Hood paradox” (Krueger, 2007:47).  The polls used in 
Krueger’s (2007) study are from the West Bank and the Gaza Stip. He finds that having 
secondary school or higher education, and living standards above the poverty-line is 
positively connected to participation in Hezbollah.  
Further investigation of the mechanisms making individuals use terrorism in the 
Palestinian population shows to a large extent the same results. Examining data on the 
Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PJI) with comparable data from the Palestinian 
population show that both high living standards and education seem to be positively 
associated with membership in terrorism organizations (Berrebi, 2007). The 
recruitment of highly educated individuals can stem from the fact that these individuals 
in some way “cannot succeed in the non-terrorism marketplace (e.g. because of their 
heritage or social standing)” (Berrebi, 2007:8). Berrebi concludes that the link between 
terrorism and education may stem from some sort of indoctrination factor in the 
educational system (based on information from Palestinian textbooks). 
Krueger (2008) looks at individuals’ involvement in Islamic terrorist groups in the US. 
He uses background information from 67 individuals involved in Islamic terrorist 
groups versus the background of other Muslims residing in the US. Following his 
argumentation it seems to be the case that the terrorists are younger and more educated 
than the general population of Muslim Americans. This is highly different from the 
profile of other criminals, where a lack of possibilities is the factor that leads people to 
become criminals. One possibility of explaining this discrepancy is that highly educated 
and young people have more extreme views or are more willing to act on them, and thus 
are “motivated by a desire to pursue a political agenda” (Krueger, 2008:10). 
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2.3  Potential problems with the literature 
Ultimately, terrorism research is not in a healthy state. It exists on a diet of fast-food 
research: quick, cheap, ready-to-hand and nutritionally dubious. The result of a 
reluctance to move away from the limited methodologies and levels of analysis of the 
past is that while the field may appear to be relatively active and energetic, growth in key 
areas remains stunted and halting (Silke, 2001:12). 
Silke provided a gloomy picture of terrorism research back in 2001, and although the 
research on terrorism has evolved a lot since the article was published, there still seems 
to be some continuing problems in the research field (see e.g. Gunning, 2007; Young & 
Findley, 2011 and Boyle, 2012). After the review of the literature, it seems to be that 
Silke is still right in some aspects of his critique of the field. To me one major 
shortcoming is the lack of distinguishing between transnational and domestic terrorism 
and the problem with assuming that the two follow the same causal logic. As most of the 
studies are explaining the “roots” of terrorism, and often investigate both origin and 
target countries, the analyses become less efficient. Operating with many hypotheses 
and theories, and a whole range of control variables do seem to make it harder to 
conclude.  These problems seem evident, but new and better data material has made the 
possibilities of overcoming these challenges possible.  Based on the conflicting results 
from the analyses described in the previous section and my research question, I am 
focusing on shortcomings connected to inequality (deprivation factors) and identity. 
First, I will introduce what I deem to be the most important methodological 
shortcomings and then I will focus on more conceptual limitations.  
2.3.1 Indicators of economic inequality and ethnicity  
Economic inequality is concomitant with social cleavages between classes, religions, 
generations, and the sexes; between educational and occupational strata; and between 
linguistic, ethnic, and communal groups (Lichbach1989:432). 
The studies testing the deprivation hypothesis in order to explain terrorism do not seem 
to find strong supportive results. My first critique is connected to the different 
operationalizations of poverty and inequality, the second critique is connected to the 
measures used to describe the connection between ethnicity and terrorism.  
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First, the research has all together not given any strong evidence of poverty being a 
positive indicator on the levels of terrorism. But, as we have seen, poverty is often 
measured by GDP per capita. Using GDP per capita as a proxy for poverty is potentially 
flawed, as this does not capture any distributional factors of economic resources in the 
country (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011; Enders & Hoover, 2012). Thus using the GINI 
coefficient seems to be a significant improvement when explaining the causal logic 
between economically impoverished individuals and terrorism.  
The GINI variable shows how the income distribution in a country differs from an equal 
distribution (Buhaug et al., 2013:9). Basically the critique of using the GINI as measure 
of inequality is that the variable may not show the whole picture. Countries that do not 
have a high GINI coefficient may experience high levels of inequality at the local-level 
(Østby, 2011:22).  The fact is that this measure does not capture the complexity of the 
relationship between social disparities that may produce incentives for groups to use 
terrorism.  Not only is the GINI coefficient flawed in that it has a lot of missing values, it 
is also said to be flawed with bias. It seems to be systematic missing values for countries 
with civil war or which experience conflict (Østby, 2011). As we have seen earlier in this 
chapter, terrorism is often connected to civil conflict or war, and thus the GINI 
coefficient may give biased results.  
Another problem with using the GINI coefficient is that it probably cannot capture 
differences in economic factors at the local-level. Cramer (2003:406-7) points to the 
problem: 
Similarly in Rwanda there is nothing to be gained by artificially abstracting economic 
inequality, in the form of a poorly measured GINI coefficient, from the country’s history, 
from the combination of population pressure on land and a history of poor policy 
choices, from the vagaries of international commodity markets, from the agency of 
individuals and groups, and from international interest and the timing of international 
demands for democratization. 
The focus on aggregated economic differences between individuals may therefore 
camouflage the real inequality, and countries that have low scores on the GINI 
coefficient might have a high degree of inequality on the local (sub-national) level of 
analysis.   
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The second critique is related to measurements of ethnicity. The conflicting results in 
connection to ethnicity and terrorism may stem from using problematic variables which 
do not capture the complex relationship between the ethnic groups in a country. The 
most common variable used in the studies mentioned in section 2.2 use the Ethno-
Linguistic Fractionalization index (ELF)20. This variable shows us the probability of 
drawing two individuals with different ethnicity from a population.  The critique and 
debate of the usage of ELF is highlighted in the study of civil war, as it is only reasonable 
to look at the relationship between the ethnic groups and the state if we want to say 
anything about the likelihood of civil war/conflict (Cederman & Giraldin, 2007).  
Such tests of ethnicity misstate the theory in at least two crucial ways. First, they tend to 
assume that violence is primarily a reflection of individual, as opposed to group-level 
dynamics. Second, conventional econometric models also implicitly assume that conflict 
patterns are entirely symmetric (Cederman & Giraldin, 2007:182). 
As the ELF variable is not apt to explaining the relationship between ethnic groups or 
between an ethnic group and the state, it seems unlikely that the variable can tell in 
which way ethnicity and terrorism are connected.  The problem with using such a 
measure is that terrorism (in most part) is an organized activity, and therefore drawing 
two individuals at random will not give us information on the groups which use 
terrorism.   
Attempting to overcome the problems connected to the use of ELF, Piazza (2011; 2012) 
uses more suitable variables from the Minorities at Risk dataset (MAR). Using variables 
from MAR is a substantial improvement from using variables such as ELF. MAR 
“monitors and analyzes the status of minorities in all countries with a current 
population of at least 500,000 at the group level. The minorities “at risk” are defined as 
an ethnic group that: “Collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discrimatory 
treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society; and or collectively mobilizes in defense or 
promotion of its self-defined interests” (MAR 2009:1).  
The results from Piazza’s (2011; 2012) analysis show that there is a significant and 
positive impact of minority discrimination on the levels of terrorism. Although his 
analysis initially is a step in the right direction, the study still suffers from some 
                                                        
20  The ELF is based on information about ethnic groups from the old soviet ethnographic Atlas Narodov 
Mira and is based on the Herfindahl formula of concentration.  
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limitations. By using MAR variables (aggregated to the country-level of analysis) Piazza 
misses some of the complexity in the interaction between ethnic groups and the state, as 
the dataset may suffer from some selection bias. Cederman et al. (2009) emphasizes the 
problems with MAR: 
The MAR-dataset “hardwires” the degree of power access to the sample definition by 
excluding groups in power from systematic investigation. This reduces the comparative 
horizon and thus makes it harder to capture the effects of political exclusion in 
ambiguous ways (Cerderman et al., 2009: 91).   
Piazza`s use of MAR may therefore be problematic. By selecting only minorities that are 
at risk, we have a problem of selecting on the dependent variable, which may cause 
biased results (Østby, 2011). An argument can be made that a group`s relative 
opportunity to influence the conventional political channels could reduce or induce 
terrorist action. Further, the different indicators of grievances provided by MAR are 
”quite crude and are largely based on statements and actions by group leaders, which 
produces rather subjective evaluations of group deprivation” (Østby, 2011:39).  
2.3.2  Conceptual limitations: deprivation and inequality 
Problems ascribed to the quality of data and levels of analysis apply to all studies of 
inequality, identity and terrorism/political violence. Yet another problem arises when 
we look at the conceptual framework used, which proposes that some kind of economic 
inequality (related to deprivation) is making  terrorism more probable. The first 
problem relates to the conceptualization of inequality as only relying on economic 
differences, which is only one dimension of the inequality aspect.  
Impoverished countries teeming with poorly educated, unemployed masses qualified by 
a widening gap between the rich and the poor combined with low literacy rates are 
fermentation tanks for dangerous and violent militants. The low levels of economic and 
social development increase the appeal of political extremism and encourage political 
violence and instability (Piazza, 2006: 160). 
Piazza (2006) illustrates the multidimensionality of the derivational factors connected 
to terrorism. The first conceptual problem of the literature on deprivation and grievance 
in relation to terrorism is the one-dimensional focus on economic factors. What is not 
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emphasized enough is the multidimensionality of derivational factors. Solely focusing on 
the economics can conceal other important motivational factors. For example, there is 
little notion of how political discrimination and economic factors operate together and 
that this may be a potent motivational factor for groups’ using terrorism. Deprivation 
factors can also be ascribed to differences in connection to political, cultural and social 
factors. Unequal access to these factors is conceptually as important as unequal 
distribution of economic assets (Stewart, 2008). These differences can also be ascribed 
to an ethnic group’s unequal access to political positions in the state (Cederman et al., 
2010). So to be able to address the proposed link between deprivation and terrorism, we 
need to look at the multidimensionality of the inequality aspect.  
The second factor is the theory building which focus on country specific and individual 
explanations. The evidence is mainly built on cross-country results, describing 
aggregated differences at country-level in relation to deprivation factors. As terrorism in 
most cases is a group phenomenon (although we do have some exceptions), the 
exclusive focus on individual attributes measured at country-level may not be able to 
identify the differences at the sub-national level. It seems reasonable to expect that what 
motivates terrorist organizations is not best captured by differences at national-level, 
because we lose an important aspect of the terrorist phenomenon. 
Following this line of argumentation factors connected to the individual-level of analysis 
using survey-data has made it possible to say something about why specific individuals 
partake in terrorist actions. But it is hard to draw from this evidence when trying to 
understand what it is that motivates groups. Even though Krueger & Malekova (2003) 
do not find a link between individual deprivation and terrorism, this does not exclude 
the possibility that deprivation factors on behalf of a group (or for a part of the 
population) are important in the mobilization process for terrorism. The individual level 
analysis has also to a large extent only focused on a specific part of the terrorist 
phenomenon, namely transnational terrorism, and why individuals in (mainly) the 
Middle East are engaged in terrorist activity.  The evidence may therefore not apply to 
terrorism in other parts of world.  Piazza (2012) describes in which way the research on 
terrorism should move. Highlighting that the levels of analysis conventionally used in 
terrorism studies are flawed:  
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 One of the key problems is that the measurements used in the analysis are still over-
aggregated. Future studies that are able to “drill down” to the subnational group or 
individual levels might be better apt to establish a more satisfactory explanation of how 
generalized or economic discrimination propels individuals to join terrorist groups or 
support terrorism (Piazza, 2012; 542).  
2.4 Where do we go from here 
In the next chapter I will introduce the theory of horizontal inequality  which will explain 
the structural factors which may produce grievances and mobilization of groups. The 
theory provides a theoretical framework that explains the structural asymmetries that 
make ethnic groups use terrorism. The causal mechanisms will be shown through more 
specific theories on ethnic group mobilization (Gurr 1993; 2000) and grievance based 
theories directly connected to terrorism (Crenshaw 1981; Ross 1993) will help 
explaining the causal relationship.  
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3. Theory 
Previous quantitative research on terrorism has not been able to sufficiently account for 
group-level variance and inequality between groups. This chapter defines the theoretical 
background for this thesis. It draws knowledge from the civil war literature, as this field 
has come further in theorizing how horizontal inequalities affect political violence. It 
also provides hypotheses derived from the theoretical discussion. 
3.1  Defining horizontal inequalities  
Men may and do certainly joke about or ridicule the strange and bizarre customs of men 
from other ethnic groups, because these customs are different from their own. But they 
do not fight over such differences alone. When men do, on the other hand, fight across 
ethnic lines it is nearly always the case that they fight over some fundamental issues 
concerning the distribution and exercise of power, whether economic, political, or both 
(Cohen, 1974:94) 
Studies indicate that inequality and poverty make societies susceptible for civil war and 
political violence, especially if the patterns follow culturally defined groups (Lia, 
2005:103). These inequalities are described as horizontal, rather than vertical. 
Horizontal inequalities measure differences between groups, while vertical inequalities 
(VIs) measure inequalities between individuals in a country. Stewart (2008:4) defines 
HIs as; “(…) inequalities in economic, social or political status between culturally defined 
groups”. The theory of horizontal inequality connects both theories of relative 
deprivation and social identity theory (Østby, 2011:31). In this case it is therefore 
necessary to know what is implied with relative deprivation. One interpretation of 
relative deprivation stems from Davies (1962)21. He proposes a theory of revolution 
where there is a discrepancy between what is expected and what you get. Put shortly, 
revolutions are more probable after a period where expectations are rising (when the 
economic climate is better). Revolution is not probable if there has not been a period 
with increasing hope and anticipation in the society (Davies, 1962: 17). Later on Gurr 
(1970) expanded Davis’s theory to include other forms of political violence (not only 
revolutions). Gurr’s theory is based on a psychological notion that there is a relationship 
between intensity of deprivation and collective violence. Relative deprivation is defined 
                                                        
21 The notion goes as far back as Aristotle (Gurr, 1970). 
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as an individual’s perception of a discrepancy between their expectations and 
capabilities (Gurr, 1970:24).  The feeling of deprivation thus produces grievances and 
therefore serves as a mobilizing factor for political violence. This notion of relative 
deprivation is usually connected to material and economic well-being.  
Rather than focusing on the individual psychological mechanisms that may turn relative 
deprivation into violence, Gurr (1993) builds on his previous work and introduces a 
theory which connects relative deprivation between minority ethnic groups, and 
explains how and why these groups rebel. His theory provides an ethnic and structural 
framework to explain violence and civil upheaval. The theory predicts that when there is 
a relative discrepancy between what groups get and what they feel that they deserve, 
the relative gap between what is expected and what is reality can produce grievances. 
Gurr`s basic theoretical premise is based on the assumption that: 
Protest and rebellion by communal groups are jointly motivated by deep-seated 
grievances about group status and by the situational determined pursuit of political 
interests, as formulated by group leaders and political entrepreneurs (Gurr, 1993:166-
67) 
His general argument is that grievances and the reasons for these are critical in the early 
stages of group mobilization. Gurr finds in his analysis of minority groups and rebellion 
that there is a clear connection when “economic disadvantages, especially those 
associated with discrimination and poverty, are consistently correlated with economic 
and social grievances and demands for greater political rights” (Gurr, 1993:188).  
Building on Gurr’s (1993) notion of inter-group inequality, Frances Stewart (2008:4) 
emphasize the multidimensionality of the horizontal inequalities, and that these can be 
divided into four different categories of HIs. These are: social, political, economic and 
cultural (Stewart, 2008). Political HIs are connected to the ethnic groups position in 
relation to the executive power / government, and being excluded from participating in 
political life is an important factor of political HIs (Østby, 2008b). Groups being excluded 
from power happen all around the world, one example of a group experiencing exclusion 
from central power is the Kurds in Turkey.  
The social HIs are connected to social factors, such as unemployment, education and 
healthcare. One example may be when an ethnic group in one region has unequal access 
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to healthcare and education, which has been the case in Nepal (Mursheed & Gates, 
2005). The cultural HIs, which are differences between groups, are connected to 
culturally inherited factors, such as official language or religion (Stewart, 2008). 
Inequalities along the cultural dimension have a focus on differential treatment from the 
state (and others) when it comes to culture “in itself”. Langer & Brown (2008:42) define 
cultural HIs as “perceived or actual differences in the treatment, public recognition or 
status of different groups’ cultural norms, practices, symbols and customs”.  
Last, but not least, the economic factors regards differences between ethnic groups in 
the economic sense, where one group may be better or worse off economically than the 
rest of the population. Iran has recently experienced a lot of ethnic violence, and Bradley 
(2005) emphasize the economically disadvantage of the Iranian Arabs in Khuzestan22 as 
one major factor for the upsurge in violence: 
 ..violence in Khuzestan , which is populated by Iranian Arabs who have close historical 
as well as tribal ties to Iraqi Arabs across the border. (…)About 50 Arabs have been 
implicated by the government in a series of bombings that killed 21 people after 
antigovernment riots broke out in April 2005. At least 20 were killed and, and hundreds 
were injured in the riots itself (Bradley, 2006: 184).  
Although the majority of separatist regions and ethno-nationalist groups are backwards 
economically, in some cases separatist claims also stem from regions relatively better off 
than the rest of the country. There seems to be grievances connected to being a relative 
advantaged group as well, because they might feel that they are subsidizing poorer 
regions (Horowitz, 1985). One example of such a relationship is the Sikhs in the Punjabi 
region in India. This group is relatively better off economically than the rest of the 
population, but still uses terrorism as a means in pursuing their separatist claims 
(Byman, 1998). This example shows that the combination of both economic and cultural 
factors is important, as the Sikhs are a minority in the region and the country as a whole.  
Where there are HIs present from all or several of the dimensions, there is a higher 
probability that groups will use violence against the state. In part, this is due to the 
difficulty of separating the different dimensions from each other; they are all 
interconnected (Brown & Langer, 2010; Stewart, 2008). Great economic inequalities 
                                                        
22  Despite Khuzestan’s vast natural resources, the province currently ranks among Iran’s poorest and 
least developed (Bradley, 2006:183). 
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may persist over a long period of time without raising violent response. But when these 
economic inequalities are combined with changes in cultural or political status (such as 
downgrading or exclusion from power) these economic factors can be important in the 
polarization process of the inequalities, and thus as a mobilizing agent (Langer & Brown, 
2008:51). Northern-Ireland provides a good example on the multidimensionality of 
HIs23. Northern-Ireland has had a lot of problems with ethno-nationalist terrorism 
(mainly from the IRA)24. For Northern Ireland the inequalities between Catholics and 
Protestants have been large and persistent for a long period of time. The asymmetries 
between the two groups could be seen in every aspect of life. For example in education 
the Catholics lagged behind, incomes were also much lower than for the Protestants. 
And the unemployment rates were more than double the size for the Catholics.  The 
inequalities also include different parts of the political system and exclusion from 
central power for both groups (Stewart, 2009:123).   
How do HIs become a part of the society? In some cases the HIs are persistent and 
“produced” by past colonial heritage, where the colonial powers deliberately put one 
group over others, and therefore producing lasting differences between groups in a 
country (such as in Rwanda or the Maluas in Malysia) (Brown & Langer, 2010). But it is 
also important to mention that the HIs do not have to originate from this type of 
“constructed” differences by colonial powers. In some cases the HIs are just a case of 
more peripheral groups which through modernization have more contact with the more 
powerful groups of the society (Østby, 2011: 26). So HIs can therefore be persistent over 
time, or more changeable (Brown & Langer, 2010; Østby; 2008b; 2011). From the 
perspective of individual welfare, persistent group inequality is likely to be a problem 
because it hinders the deprived from improving their situation. Even though there is a 
possibility for one individual to change his or her situation, the group as a whole has few 
opportunities to move up in distribution in economic terms (Stewart, 2009: 318-319).  
Langer and Brown (2008:51) emphasize that while socioeconomic inequalities can 
persist over decades, changes in e.g. political inequality are more severe, as it is 
                                                        
23 There are many good examples of how horizontal inequalities have played a major role in producing 
conflict, rebellion and protest, for example; South-Africa, Uganda, Sri-Lanka, Fiji, Malaysia and Brazil 
(Stewart, 2009). 
24 Also groups operating under different names, all have the same underlying motivation (e.g. INLA, ORIA 
and CIRA).  
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important in the “politicization of inequalities”. In large, group inequality tend to be 
more persistent, and more difficult to tackle, than individual inequality (Stewart, 2009).  
By now I have mostly referred to evidence from case-studies of horizontal inequalities, 
but how do the HI argument hold when testing it quantitative, and on a selection of 
different countries? Is it possible to generalize from case-studies to a wide range of 
countries?  
In one of the first studies of HIs in sub-Saharan Africa, Barrows (1976) finds a positive 
link between ethnic group differences and instability/political violence. He defines HIs 
as differences between ethnic groups and their access to politics, work and education. 
The analysis shows that regardless of type of violence, there seems to be a correlation 
between instability and differences between ethnic groups. Barrows emphasize the 
relationship as: “ethnicity takes on importance for political conflict as a manifestation of 
group response to a growing public realm” (Barrows, 1976; 166). Later Gurr & Moore 
(1997) uses the MAR-dataset and provide further evidence of a link between HIs and 
ethno-political rebellion.  Measuring different sides of the HI aspect, they find a positive 
effect of different forms of inequality (through mobilization) to ethno-political rebellion.  
Murshed and Gates (2005) use the horizontal inequality aspect to explain the Maoist 
insurgency in Nepal. They find that intergroup inequalities have robust positive 
explanatory power over the intensity of the insurgency in Nepal, and that the focus on 
both ethnicity and the cast dimension is highly relevant to explain the civil war. Using 
spatial data on geographic factors and resource availability, the analysis show that 
underprivileged regions have higher intensity of civil conflict, while regional differences 
in for example literacy did not have the same explanatory power. Mancini (2007) find 
the same positive relationship between socioeconomic HIs and violence in Nepal. In 
specific regions of Indonesia, Mancini (2005) finds a positive indication that less 
developed districts have higher probability of experiencing ethno-communal conflict. 
Østby (2008a) provided the first large-N cross-country analysis directly connecting 
horizontal inequalities to civil war, using variables derived from Demographic and 
Health Surveys (DHS) and MAR variables. The study provides evidence of a positive 
impact of HIs on civil war in developing countries in Africa. The same variables from the 
DHS show that higher levels of HIs provide higher risk of civil war and inter-group 
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conflict (Fjelde & Østby, 2012).  Although the analysis gives positive results, the scope of 
the analysis is also restricted to developing countries in Africa. There are also some 
possible problematic aspects with using the DHS data (for an evaluation of the data see 
Østby, 2008a; 2011). 
Further Cederman et al. (2011) find positive indications that economic and political HIs 
at the group-level increases the risk of ethno-nationalist civil war. The study uses data 
on geographical ethnic group settlement and geographic wealth distribution. As with 
Østby’s (2008a) analysis, Cederman et al.’s analysis also suffers from some restrictions 
regarding scope, and the data material in this case restricts the analysis to including only 
groups with a population over 500 000 and only years after 1990 (Cederman et al. 
2011). Deiwiks et al. (2012) look specifically at conflict and inequality in federations and 
show that both affluent and underdeveloped regions have higher probability of 
experiencing secessionist conflict; this is compared to regions which are more close to 
the average of the country. Also regions where there is severe ethno-nationalist 
exclusion have increased risk of conflict. They conclude that; “regional inequality 
appears to be detrimental to peace, both in regions that are much poorer and in regions 
that are much wealthier than the country average” (Dewiks et al., 2012:301)25.   
These studies all have some restrictions in scope and temporal span; therefore Buhaug 
et al. (2013) show the first large-N cross-national country-level analysis of horizontal 
inequalities. Using aggregated measures of inter-group inequality, both economic and 
political, derived from the group-level. They find a positive association between HIs and 
civil war. Thus they are able to show that there exist a positive relationship between HIs 
and civil war on a global basis.  
  
                                                        
25 Another relevant analysis level is to look at different regions, and the ethnic make-up of these. 
Cunningham & Weidman (2010) provide a global analysis of ethnic groups and conflict location for ethnic 
groups observed in the 1990s. Both using data from the Uppsala conflict dataset and connecting the 
information on conflict to groups in the MAR-dataset.  The subsequent analysis shows a positive 
connection between highly (ethnic) heterogeneous regions and conflict. This study provides evidence that 
where a ethic group have the majority, and higher degree of access to the state, makes for a “breeding 
ground” for violent conflict. 
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3.2 Group formation:  identity 
Peoples well being is not only affected by their individual circumstances, but also by how 
well their group are doing. This is partly because membership of a group is often a 
important aspect of a person`s identity, and hence the groups situation is felt as a part of 
an individual`s situation, and partly because relative impoverishment of the group 
increase the perception of members that they are likely to be permanently trapped in a 
poor situation, or, if they have managed to do better than others in the in the group, that 
they are likely to fall back into poverty (Stewart, 2009: 316).  
Clearly it is not given that emotions (grievances) trigger terrorism automatically. 
Without resources and organization, groups have little possibility for mobilization (Tilly, 
1978). What is evident from the theory of HIs is that some sort of identity is necessary 
for a group to mobilize. Identity can be connected to a large set of different identity 
markers, whereas some are more constant than others. The collective identity is a way 
of separating groups from each other and increasing coherence in the group. If the 
identities of a group do not coincide with e.g. borders, this may induce violence (Nordås, 
2004), in this case, the use of terrorism. The identity indicators become a salient 
mobilizing factor when there is some sort of differential treatment from other groups in 
society. In studies of revolutions, the focus has been on social class as a common identity 
indicator, where different class struggles have produced revolutions (e.g. Moore, 1993 
[1966]). Others believe that religious affinity is a main mobilizing agent which makes 
groups use violence (Hunington, 1993). Identity may also be strongly connected to 
geological and territorial factors (Toft, 2003). We often identify with several of these 
identity groups, but ethnic identity is proposed as being the most salient and conflict 
prone (Ellingsen, 2000; Birnir, 2006; Østby, 2011). It is important to notice that the 
ethnicity aspect often overlaps with other factors, such as religion (Østby, 2011). 
3.2.1 Ethnic identity 
To understand the underlying mechanisms that drive ethnic groups to use terrorism, we 
have to look at the mobilizing factors. Byman (1998:150) emphasizes the difference 
between ethnic terrorism and other forms:  
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Like other terrorists, ethnic terrorists attempt to influence rival groups and hostile 
governments. But unlike other terrorists, ethnic terrorists focus on forging a distinct 
ethnic identity and fostering ethnic mobilization. 
There is basically three different perspectives to understand ethnic identity and political 
violence, these are: primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism. The 
primordialist view sees ethnic identity as a fixed characteristic of a group, where the 
ethnic identity is something every individual is born with. This characteristic is not 
something that can be changed, but remains constant over time (see e.g. Geertz, 1963). 
For primordialists conflict is connected to differences in ethnicity in itself, and not by 
other factors in the society (such as political or economic differences) (Østby, 2011: 28). 
One variance of the primordialist view stems from Vanhanen (1999) who explain 
conflicts’ in a “Darwinian perspective”, and thus believes that ethnic identity and ethnic 
conflict is something inevitable. Therefore greater contact between ethnic groups 
(through the new communications and migration) will increase the levels of ethnic 
conflict.  
However the primordialist view does not explain why groups change over time, or why 
conflicts between ethnic groups erupt in some countries, while not in others. As a 
response to this the instrumentalists believe that ethnic identity is constructed by groups 
and their leaders. Basically, instrumentalists see identity as a means for groups to 
achieve a political or economic goal. Ethnicity therefore has little independent 
explanatory power outside the political realm; Rothschild (1981) calls this “politicized 
ethnicity”. The instrumentalists believe that conflicts are stimulated by elites who 
mobilize their ethnic group in pursuit of their own personal goals. Therefore it seems 
that ethnicity is something that can be exploited by the will of elites (Østby, 2011: 29).  
To some extent the instrumentalist approach to ethnic identity stems from a disregard 
of modernization theory (where ethnic factors would be replaced by class identity). 
Ethnicity is basically a set of identifying factors that are used by entrepreneurs to 
achieve an economic or political goal. In this way the ethnic identity can be used as a 
mobilizing factor for collective violence, but not as a conflict factor in itself as the 
primodialists propose (Rotschild, 1981; Nordås, 2004; Østby, 2011). 
The Constructivist approach to ethnicity is building a bridge between the primordialists 
and instrumentalists. For constructivists ethnicity is neither fixed nor completely “open” 
33 
 
(e.g. changeable), therefore ethnicity is partly inherited and also constructed and chosen 
(Østby, 2011:28-30). The constructivist approach to explaining ethnic identity seems to 
fit well with the colonial heritage in several African countries, where many tribal 
differences was partly invented by the colonial powers. The Belgian colonial rule in 
Rwanda serves as a good example of such a constructed ethnic distinction;  
…the so called ”Hamitic myth”of the sharply foreign origins of the Tutsi, a myth that –like 
most national or ethnic myths—locked Tutsi in identity into a primordial assigned 
essential difference. During the late colonial period the Belgian colonial regime 
contributed greatly to forcing the Hutu/Tutsi distinction or categorical pairing into 
viciously unstable institutional arrangement. The colonial regime did this both by 
hardening the boundaries around and between the two types, e.g. by insisting on ethnic 
labeling on identity cards, and by discriminatory policies (Cramer, 2003:407). 
Today’s literature on political violence is in large part influenced by the latter theoretical 
approach. In the constructivist view an ethnic group would be defined as:  
…people who share a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on common 
descent, shared experiences, and cultural traits. They may define themselves, and be 
defined by others, in terms of any or all of a bundle of traits: customary behavior and 
dress, religious beliefs, language, physical appearance(“race”), region of residence, 
traditional occupations, and a history of conquest and repression of culturally different 
peoples (Gurr, 2000: 4).  
The question is then—when is ethnicity an important factor in regard to terrorism? A 
constructivist answer would be when ethnicity is a major part of a group`s material 
well-being, access to political power, status or security. In this case horizontal inequality 
serves as the basis for the causal explanation of how inequality may lead groups to use 
terrorism, as structural inequality may be a mobilizing factor for terrorism. The next 
section will elaborate on how and why some ethnic groups use terrorism to address 
grievances. I postulate that structural inequality makes terrorism more likely, and that 
these inequalities are being transformed into grievances through group comparison. In 
the end these grievances trigger terrorism.  Stewart (2002) also emphasizes the fact that 
horizontal inequalities can result in small-scale protest to terrorism and civil war. To my 
knowledge no one has studied terrorism explicitly using the horizontal inequality 
framework, but it has been investigated in relation to civil war/other forms of political 
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violence. I believe that the same mechanisms are present when we want to explain 
terrorism as well. In Section 3.3 the HI argument will be connected directly to terrorism 
through grievance-mobilization model proposed by Crenshaw (1981), Ross (1993) and 
Piazza (2011). 
3.3  Linking HIs to ethno-nationalist terrorism 
Minority economic discrimination—which usually involves some combination of 
employment discrimination, unequal access to government health, educational or social 
services, formal or informal housing segregation and lack of economic opportunities 
available to the rest of society—it is a catalyst for the development of minority group 
grievances, which are directed against the state, economic status quo, mainstream 
society, and the majority population (Piazza, 2011: 341). 
Based on this assumption it becomes clear that a combination of grievance and identity 
is a strong mobilizing agent for ethno-nationalist terrorism. What is evident from the 
theory is that structural inequalities in no way alone lead to collective violence. But 
when will such structural factors be important to explain terrorism? Crenshaw (1981), 
Ross (1993) and Piazza (2011; 2012) seek to explain the root causes of terrorism 
through models that emphasize the structural factors (in this case relative deprivation) 
which in turn produce grievances between groups. Crenshaw (1981) expresses this 
quite clearly;  
The first condition that can be considered a direct cause of terrorism is the existence of 
concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, such as an 
ethnic minority discriminated against by the majority (Crenshaw, 1981:383). 
Crenshaw (1981) proposes a model where collective grievances are a motivational 
factor for terrorism. Crenshaw divides the causes of terrorism into two main factors as 
to why some groups and individuals turn to terrorism: the difference between 
preconditions and precipitant causes. Preconditions are factors that set the stage for 
terrorism in the long run. The preconditions can further be divided into permissive 
factors, which are enabling factors such as the country`s level of modernization and 
political system (Crenshaw, 1981).The precipitant causes are specific events that forgo a 
terrorist attack. Although Crenshaw sees grievances to be a prominent factor of 
terrorism, it is the structural factors such as level of modernization that enable terrorists 
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to mobilize. Therefore it is not the grievances in itself, but the change in society which 
make them salient (Crenshaw, 1981:381).  
Ross (1993) further establishes the link between grievances and mobilization for 
terrorism. He relies on both Crenshaw (1981) and Gurr’s (1970) relative deprivation 
argument when he introduces his theoretical model. The argument is based on the 
notion that there exist three prominent causes of terrorism: Psychological, rational 
choice and structural. The psychological causes explain why individuals join terrorist 
organizations. The rational choice model sees the participant’s cost-benefit calculations 
as important. The structural factors are the environment, and the political, cultural, 
social and economic structure of societies. In his quest to find a causal link, he relies on 
the structural factors (Ross, 1993:317). He also uses Crenshaw`s distinction between 
permissive and precipitant causes of terrorism. The permissive factors are geographical 
location, level of modernization and political system. The precipitant causes are divided 
into seven categories26. He emphasizes that grievances have to be regarded as the most 
salient of the structural, precipitant cause of terrorism. Of all the precipitant causes the 
grievance category is also the most complex, and the grievances which lead to terrorism 
can be divided into seven categories, these are: ethnic, racial, legal, economic, political, 
religious and social (Ross, 1993:325). Ross concludes that the patterns of terrorism are 
complex, and that all structural factors interact.  
More directly connected to the proposed link between HIs and terrorism, Piazza (2011; 
2012) uses the grievance model in connection to discrimination, and focuses on the 
structural discrimination of minority groups as a salient in the mobilization for 
terrorism. This is because discrimination reinforces exclusion and the sense of 
otherness among the different groups in society. Piazza uses the abovementioned causal 
framework (Crenshaw, 1981; Ross, 1993) but rather than using the “general” notion of 
relative deprivation, he builds on Gurr (1993) and thus has a clear ethnic group focus. 
When the grievances are deep and the sense of group identity is strong, it is potentially 
important as a mobilizing factor for terrorism. When the grievance factors can be 
organized by political leaders they can be the basis for strong mobilization for collective 
action, in this case terrorism.  
                                                        
26 The precipitant causes are: “social, cultural, and historical facilitation, organizational split and 
development, presence of other forms of unrest, support, counterterrorist failure, availability of weapons 
and explosives and grievances “(Ross, 1993:381). 
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Figure 1 shows a highly simplified version of my causal-chain. The structural 
asymmetries (HIs) are affecting the level of collective grievance in the group. The 
collective felt grievances then enhance both the level of identity (while the identity 
aspect also affect collective grievance), and promote group mobilization. As the model 
show, both economic and political horizontal inequalities and the identity affect group 
mobilization27.  
Figure 1: Causal model of the relationship between HIs and terrorism 
 
 
3.4 Arriving at testable hypotheses of HIs and terrorism 
In this section I will introduce my hypotheses in regard to the causal mechanisms 
introduced in this chapter. The abovementioned discussion and theoretical framework 
clearly point out that structural factors such as political opportunity and economic 
factors are important when explaining why groups mobilize and use terrorism. The 
general assumption throughout this thesis is that horizontal inequality produce strong 
grievances and that these grievances are specifically strong when they follow ethnic 
(cultural) cleavages. The hypotheses proposed will be derived from my general research 
question:  
Countries with groups facing strong horizontal inequalities have higher rates and 
probability of experiencing terrorism than more egalitarian countries. 
                                                        
27 What is also evident from the theory on political violence is that economic and political inequality also 
affects the opportunity of the groups to use terrorism. In a rational-actor perspective HIs might also be a 
condition for opportunity. For example rich groups may have more resources to mobilize (see Tilly, 1978 
for the resource-mobilization school and Ellingsen, 2000 for a summary of the debate).  
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The theory proposed has a specific group focus, and thus the appropriate level of 
analysis is at the group-level. The hypotheses will be postulated at both the country-
level and at the group-level of analysis. The disaggregated group-level approach gives 
opportunities to show the causal mechanisms that make ethnic groups use terrorism, 
which follows directly from the theoretical discussion. But a disaggregated approach 
clearly has its restrictions as the group-level approach by design exclude countries and 
cases where ethnicity has no relevance. Therefore I will include hypotheses at the 
national-level as well. This is mainly because of the constraints with using the 
disaggregated approach, and also to see if my argument holds for all types of domestic 
terrorism. Lastly, it gives me opportunities to compare my results to previous research.  
Due to data constraints, and the scope of this thesis I am only testing factors connected 
to economic and political horizontal inequality, which I believe to be two strong factors. 
These factors are also found to be significant and positive predictors of civil war (Østby, 
2008a; 2008b; 2011; Cederman et al., 2011; Buhaug et al., 2013). It is also due to the fact 
that it is hard to gather good and reliable data on horizontal inequality. 
3.4.1 Country-level hypotheses 
Following what is found in previous studies of HIs and based on what was proposed 
earlier, a group`s relative position in regards to political rights are important when 
explaining terrorism (e.g. Crenshaw, 1981; Ross, 1993; Piazza, 2011; 2012). Therefore I 
expect to find that countries with an excluded ethnic group will experience higher rates 
and probability of domestic terrorism than countries which do not have any politically 
excluded ethnic groups. This gives the first hypothesis: 
H1: The rates and probability of terrorism increases in countries with at least one 
politically excluded ethnic group. 
Stewart (2008) also emphasizes that horizontal inequalities can stem from political 
inequalities between groups in a society. The discrepancy between the excluded group, 
and the group(s) in power, makes the group identity aspect more salient, and thus 
produces strong group grievances. As H1 does not capture the differences between 
groups, but rather if a country possesses one (or more) excluded ethnic group(s), I 
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therefore want to test the relationship between the largest excluded group in society 
vis-à-vis the group(s) in power. This gives me my second hypothesis: 
H2: The rates and probability of terrorism increases in countries with severe 
political horizontal inequalities. 
Economic grievances  
To more specifically tap into the economic horizontal inequality aspect, the next 
hypothesis more specifically introduces inter-group economic inequality aspect at the 
country-level. The levels of domestic terrorism will be higher in countries where there 
are large economic inequalities, and some groups are more economically disadvantaged 
than the majority of the population:  
H3a: The rates and probability of terrorism increases in countries with large income 
gap between the economic average and the poorest group. 
Further based on the previous discussion, it is also likely to be a connection between 
groups being richer than the county average. This might (as Horowitz, 1985 and Dewkis 
et al., 2012 proposes) stem from the unwillingness to distribute their resources to more 
disadvantaged regions of the country. To exemplify this point we can look at the 
Catalans or the Basques in Spain. This generates my next hypothesis: 
H3b: The rates and probability of terrorism increases in countries with large income 
gap between the average and the richest group. 
Stewart (2008) proposes that where all four inequality factors coincide with the ethnic 
cleavages in society, this will lead to higher risk of conflict. My last hypothesis test this 
by proposing that countries with both economic and political HIs have higher 
probability and rates of terrorism. 
H4: The rates and probability of terrorism increases in countries with both political 
and economic horizontal inequalities. 
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3.4.2  Group-level hypotheses 
Basically the group-level hypotheses are based on the same theoretical foundation, but 
are postulated with a specific group focus. Ethnic groups which in some way experience 
exclusion from the majority will have a stronger mobilizing agent than included groups. 
On the basis of what is found by Cederman et al. (2011), where exclusion from central 
power was found to have a strong positive effect on ethno-nationalist civil war, I 
propose that the same causal relationship is present in regard to terrorism, and this 
yields my fifth hypothesis; 
H5: Politically excluded ethnic groups are more likely to use terrorism, than 
included groups 
Economic grievances  
Rather than focusing on individual economic inequality, as previous scholars has done 
(e.g. Krueger & Malekova, 2003; Krueger, 2007, Berrebi, 2008), I focus on inter-group 
differences. The sixth hypothesis proposes that groups experiencing high economic 
inequality will be more likely to use terrorism: 
H6: Ethnic groups far from the income average have higher probability of using 
terrorism than groups at the income average. 
When looking closely at economic horizontal inequality it seems unlikely that the 
relationship should be the same for rich and poor groups. It is reason to believe that the 
interaction between economic inequality and terrorism at the group-level are twofold 
(Horowitz, 1985; Cederman et al., 2011). Both advantaged and disadvantaged groups 
are likely to use political violence. There are many examples of terrorist groups that are 
from an advantaged group such as the (Punjab) Sikhs in India. In regards to this 
phenomenon, I want to test whether or not there is a difference between poor and rich 
groups respectively:  
H7a: Poor ethnic groups are more likely to engage in terrorism than the groups at 
the income average.  
H7b: Rich ethnic groups have higher probability of using terrorism than those at the 
income average. 
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As was the case for the country level, I propose that the effect of HIs is stronger when 
they operate together, therefore: 
H8: Ethnic groups experiencing both political and economic HIs have higher 
probability of using terrorism. 
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4. Research design and data 
In sum, we believe that, where possible, social science research should be both general 
and specific: it should tell us something about classes of events as well as about specific 
events at particular places. We want to be timeless and time bound at the same time 
(King et al., 1994:43). 
In the study of social phenomena the most widely used distinction is between using 
quantitative and qualitative methods. One the one hand, the qualitative method is apt to 
explaining in depth one phenomenon or a set of cases, such as one specific country and 
features in specific cases. One of the limitations with the qualitative literature is that the 
findings cannot be generalized to a larger set of cases or areas, and this research is often 
accused of being biased (easy to select cases that match the research question). What 
qualitative investigation can bring to the table is rather an understanding of a causal 
relationship, and these understandings can be the baseline for further research (King et 
al., 1994).  Therefore qualitative methods are especially important in that they provide 
the information necessary to build strong theoretical linkages, which in turn can be 
tested on a larger scale.  
On the other hand, quantitative methods gives us the possibility of generalizing what is 
found to a larger sample, and thus makes it possible to say something of a larger pattern 
of interaction to explain specific phenomena (King et al., 1994).  Since my research 
question is of a general character, and I want to investigate broadly how horizontal 
inequalities are affecting the likelihood of terrorism it is reasonable to use a quantitative 
method.  
4.1 Why disaggregate? 
As we have seen in Chapter 2 the majority quantitative studies of terrorism is conducted 
at the country-level, using highly aggregated variables to describe sub-national 
differences. But what do these proxies really tell us about the grievances of specific 
terrorist organizations?   
Measuring differences among countries at the national level give us general information 
on the different structural factors which can be “roots of terrorism”, but these studies 
may not help us understand the complexity of terrorist phenomenon. The theories often 
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used to explain terrorism (e.g. Crenshaw, 1981 and Ross, 1993) focus on the sub-
national level and have an explicit group focus. The unfortunate consequence when 
studying terrorism at the inappropriate level is that the importance of sub-national 
factors is overlooked. If we are going to understand the influence of horizontal 
inequality it is essential to go beyond the national level of analysis—and develop  
research designs which are able to account for variations in economic development, 
education and ethnic composition at the local/sub-national level of analysis (Buhaug, 
2005:17). A disaggregated group-level approach gives opportunities to say something 
about the mechanisms that make ethnic groups use terrorism. This follows directly from 
the theoretical discussion in Chapter 3 which postulates that inter-group inequalities 
and group mobilization are potentially very important for terrorism, and that structural 
asymmetries (HIs) produce strong group grievances.   
But how do we measure HIs? The most important step is to determine which identity 
factors and boundaries are important in each country (Manchini et al., 2008), and then 
focus on measuring inequalities for these groups. My new dataset include information 
based on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset 
(EPR-ETH). Using information from these datasets it was possible for me to identify 
terrorist groups which matched the ethnic identity markers in the EPR-ETH dataset; this 
provides the opportunity to further investigate ethno-nationalist terrorism. In the next 
sections I will introduce the two datasets, and then give a description of the coding and 
work I have done to make the new group-based terrorism data.  
4.1.1 Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (EPR-ETH)  
Chapter 3 introduced the notion that we have a variety of identity markers for terrorist 
groups (class, political-ideological standpoint, religion or ethnic group). Ethnic identity 
is regarded as one of the most important in relation to conflict and political violence. 
This is because the ethnic identity is based on fundamental factors such as history, 
religion or language (Gurr, 1993; Ellingsen, 2000; Østby, 2011). Because ethnic 
identities are the most “salient” of the identity markers, I am relying on identifying 
inequalities between groups on the basis of ethnic identity. The EPR dataset provides 
the most comprehensive list of ethnic groups, and not at least the possibility of 
controlling for factors through time and space. This is because this dataset also provide 
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the opportunity to use geo-referenced variables. It also includes information on ethnic 
groups’ political relevance and influence over the state. 
The EPR-ETH28 dataset serves as the basis of my new disaggregated approach, and 
provides information on all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to power 
from 1946-2009 (Cederman et al., 2010; Vogt, 2011). The EPR-ETH is an extension of 
the original EPR dataset, the differences is mostly connected to the inclusion criteria and 
an updated timeframe29. To be included in the EPR-ETH the countries have to be 
sovereign and have a population of over 500, 000 (Vogt, 2011). The EPR-ETH provides 
information on over 790 groups around the world30. The EPR-ETH defines ethnicity as:  
 …any subjectively experienced sense of commonality based on a belief in common 
ancestry and shared culture. Different markers may be used to indicate such shared 
ancestry and culture: common language, similar phonotypical features, adherence to the 
same faith (Cederman et al., 2010:2).  
The EPRs definition of ethnicity thus includes ethno-religious, ethno-linguistic and 
racially distinct groups. An ethnic group is politically relevant if at least one political 
actor claims to represent the group as a whole at the national level, and also if the group 
is in some way discriminated in the politics of the state (Cederman et al., 2010). The 
coding of political access is based on a given country’s power constellations and the level 
of control the executive power have over different parts of the political system such as 
the presidency, army and senior posts in the administration (Cederman et al., 2010). 
Following this the EPR categorizes all ethnic groups according to three factors:  
(1) Whether those who claimed to represent a group’s interest held full control of the 
executive branch with no meaningful participation by members of any other group (2) 
                                                        
28 The EPR-ETH is available at the country- and group-level from: www.icr.ethz.ch/data/growup/epr-eth. 
29 The original EPR dataset covers the period 1946-2005 (see Vogt, 2011 for more information). 
30This distinguishes the dataset from MAR (mentioned in section 2.3.1), which includes only minorities 
that are at risk or groups that already have mobilized, the dataset does not include small groups or groups 
in power (Gurr, 2000:8). The EPR does not cover all countries or groups in the world, and small states 
where there are no politically relevant ethnic groups are not included. Although there are limitations to 
the EPR dataset as well, I rely on the notion that this dataset, and variables provided are better apt to 
explain political violence and that this dataset is the best available on ethnic groups to date. The critique of 
the MAR dataset has led a working group at the University of Maryland to provide an overview of the 
problems, and to the creation of a new MAR dataset.  They point out that: “The EPR is a substantial 
improvement on MAR, and our study suggests that the concerns over selection bias in the original MAR 
were well funded”(Binir et al., 2012: 4). 
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whether they divided power with members of other groups in a power-sharing regime, 
or (3) whether they were excluded altogether from decision-making authority within 
the halls of the central state power (Cederman et al., 2010:99-100).  
Active discrimination can either be formal or informal. Formal discrimination occurs 
when the state legally forbids certain groups with specific languages or religions from 
being part of the political positions. This was the case for the African Americans until the 
civil rights movement. Informal discrimination intentionally and actively restrains 
individuals from specific groups from “rising within the ranks of government” 
(Cederman et al., 2010:4). 
4.1.2  Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 
Information on terrorist events and perpetrators are gathered from the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) which is an open source database provided by the National Consortium 
of the Study of Terrorism and Responses (START)31. The GTD dataset provides 
information on both domestic and international terrorism for the period 1970-2010 
(START, 2013b). To my knowledge this is the most comprehensive of the datasets 
available on terrorism to date. The data material provided in the GTD is gathered using 
news sources, journals, books, existing terrorism datasets and legal documents. One 
special feature of the GTD dataset is that it has been gathered in two phases (GTD1: 
1970-1997 and GTD2:1998-2007).  After 2008 the coding was done in real time. 
Another aspect which may be troubling is regarding the data from 199332 as a large part 
of the 1993 data are missing from the dataset. The number of cases for 1993 (that are 
available) only represents about 15% of the actual attacks, and therefore the data for 
1993 is excluded from the synthesized GTD dataset33 (START, 2013a).  
I am using a synthesized account of both GTD1 and GTD2 provided by START, which is 
totalling 104.000 incidents. The dataset has information on location, date, weapons 
used, the target, number of victims and information on perpetrator in the cases where it 
is possible to identify a group (START, 2013b). Before synthesizing the two datasets the 
GTD1 had to meet all the inclusion criteria from GTD2, and therefore the incidents which 
                                                        
31 The GTD dataset can be downloaded from: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/contact/ 
32 When moving the data from PGIS to START the data from GTD1 for 1993 fell out of the car on the way to 
START (Enders et al., 2011:322). 
33 Data from 1993 is also available at Start.edu.com 
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did not meet the criteria were dropped from the dataset. (The GTD1 only included 44 
descriptive variables to each event, while the GTD2 included 84 variables. In those cases 
where it was possible the coders developed the same information for the GTD1 as the 
GTD2) (START, 2013b).  
The GTD operates with a wide definition of terrorism: 
…the threatened or actual use of illegal force by a non-state actor to attain political, 
economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation (GTD, 2011:6). 
If an event is to be coded as a terrorist attack in the GTD three of the following attributes 
has to be met (START, 2011:5):  
The incident must be intentional- the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a 
perpetrator.  
 The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence- including 
property violence, as well as against people.  
 The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors- this database does 
not include acts of state violence.  
After these three attributes are examined, the GTD also includes three criteria variables, 
so that the researches can choose the definition which matches the research question. 
Therefore at least two of the following three criteria must be met to be included in the 
GTD (2011:5):  
Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social 
goal.  
Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey 
some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.  
Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.  
 The GTD further provides the opportunity to remove cases which do not follow the 
criteria that the researcher wants to include. Not only does the GTD include these 
criteria, but GTD2 also includes a variable labeled “Doubt Terrorism Proper” which 
records if the event may not be a “proper” terrorist attack, and basically implies that the 
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attack may not be a terrorist action, the attack may be part of a guerrilla action, intra- or 
inter-group conflict or some other form of crime. This means that the analyst using the 
GTD has the choice to assess if the attack is proper or not (START, 2011).  
4.1.3 Joining GTD with EPR-ETH  
In this section I will present the new data I have coded, as well as give examples of some 
of the challenges I met throughout working with the coding. Following this in Section 
4.1.4 I will be discussing the possible limitations with this approach. 
I have combined data from the GTD-dataset on terrorist groups, with an ethnic, ethno-
nationalist/separatist claim (hence Chapter 2.1.1) with ethnic groups from the EPR-ETH 
dataset. The dataset provides new opportunities to attain knowledge about the 
underling mechanisms of this type of terrorism. To my knowledge this is the first 
attempt of joining the EPR and GTD, and thus creates a new disaggregated dataset on 
ethno-nationalist terrorism. The new dataset covers the time period from 1970-2009, 
for 155 countries.  
Before starting with the coding of the groups I had to do some changes to the original 
GTD dataset.  Following Enders et al. (2011) I removed cases which did not fit the 
inclusion criteria (see 1-3 in section 4.3.3) as well as attacks which were defined as 
“Doubt Terrorism Proper” in the GTD dataset. One of the major problems when using 
perpetrator information on terrorism is the large amount of events with unknown 
perpetrators. The extensive number of unknown may be because multiple groups claim 
responsibility, bad media coverage or the fact that the groups want to stay anonymous.  
In the full GTD dataset information on perpetrator is available for about 40-50% of the 
events, and the information of the perpetrators may not contain that much information. 
Therefore I removed all attacks which had perpetrator information that was described 
as either “Unknown”, “Individual” or “Gunmen”. Removing uncertain events and events 
without any information of perpetrator leaves 41.399 observations in the dataset, which 
is substantially lower than the number which is provided when not including these 
restrictions (the original GTD dataset included 98.112 observations). The next step then 
was to identify groups from GTD and match these groups to ethnic groups found in the 
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EPR-ETH dataset. Each group in the GTD dataset was given a unique group-id; this id 
made it possible to go back and see which groups that were coded in my dataset. 
In many aspects the coding proved challenging as the GTD does not always have 
consistent names for the groups they have recorded. Further examples of challenges 
were that many terrorist organizations operate with aliases or cover names, terrorism 
in context of civil war, spillover-effects and not being able to pinpoint a clear ethnic 
identity. The rest of the section will give some examples of the challenges I have met in 
relation to the coding of groups.  
First, to identify the ethnicity and motives of the groups I have relied on a large amount 
of sources, specifically START’s own “Terrorist Organization Profiles” site has provided a 
lot of the information used to classify the groups34. Further, the information on terrorist 
organizations in Asia has in large part been gathered from the South Asia Terrorism 
Portal (SATP)35. Based on the information on the different terrorist organizations it was 
possible for me to link a group from the GTD with an ethnic group in the EPR-ETH.  
When working on the coding of the groups, one challenge was the difficulty in ascribing 
a group with one specific ethnic identity. For some groups the ethnic identity was clear 
while in other cases the identity (and goals) of the groups were not as straight forward. 
Masters (2008:402)36 describes the difficulty of labeling terrorist groups well in his 
article:   
If we accept the notion that the universe of active terrorist groups includes groups with 
pure ideological goals and groups with combined or mixed ideological goals (that is to 
say cross over groups), then the terrorist universe is indeed more complicated than we 
may have previously admitted to. 
Giving a terrorist group a specific ethnic objective may be problematic as the reasons for 
the use of terrorism might vary widely.  For example, Taliban in Afghanistan is coded as 
the Pashtun ethnic group, because the majority of the group consists of members from 
the group and their ideology is based on a Pashto understanding of religion37. Although 
                                                        
34 See start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/ for information on terrorist organizations.  
35 See http://www.satp.org/ for information on terrorist organizations in Asia. Other sites used in the 
process are e.g : cfr.org, ntctc.gov, cidcm.umd.edu/mar,  ucdp.uu.se  
36 See Masters (2008) appendix for a list of terrorist groups and ideological categories. 
37 The majority of the Taliban is from the Pashtun ethnic group, and Taliban is Pashto for “students”. See: 
http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/taliban.html. 
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their goal may not be directly described as ethno-nationalist, it is basically my 
understanding that the group may be ascribed both an ethno-nationalist and religious 
fundamentalist distinction, and that they can be described as a mixed ideology terrorist 
group (Masters, 2008).   
In many cases through the process of coding terrorist groups and events, the complexity 
of the terrorist phenomenon has become evident. What is often the case for the terrorist 
groups is the complexity of motivating factors. The groups are in addition often using 
terrorist tactics in a larger setting of civil war. One example of a group which has used a 
wide range of tactics and “covers” are the National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA). Angola has been haunted by violent conflicts in the past four decades, 
making the country’s post-colonial history one of the worst in African history. The 
insurgency group UNITA started to use guerilla tactics, especially after the independence 
of Angola in 1975. Throughout the civil war the group at times masqueraded as a 
political party, while most of all working as a guerilla group. The group conducted 
numerous attacks on the civilian population in the years between 1975 and 2002. 
Through the 1990s the group stepped up its terror tactics and used torture, executions, 
forced displacement and mine laying (Malequias, 2007). I have recorded a peak in 1990 
where the group was behind 192 terrorist attacks in Angola. Even though the terrorist 
actions are part of a larger picture of civil war/conflict, this proves that it in some cases 
is just one of the insurgent tactics (as mentioned in Chapter 2). The UNITA group is 
representing/have a majority in the Ovimbundu ethnic group, and the group is coded as 
discriminated in the EPR-ETH dataset38.  
India is one of the countries in the dataset which is plagued by terrorism and conflict.  
The country is represented with 19 politically relevant ethnic groups in EPR-ETH, and 
has over the years experienced a lot of ethno-nationalist terrorism. The regions 
bordering Pakistan are plagued by terrorism, where different Kashmiri groups operate, 
such as Jamiat-ul-Mahammad and Hizbul Muhajideen. These groups are conducting 
numerous attacks in India, based on Kashmir separatism. The groups also often use 
different aliases, and thus a large amount of groups are conducting terrorism using 
different names but with largely the same goals. Although the groups are mainly 
                                                        
38 In my data, looking at onset ratio of civil war (from UCDP) 29 group-years have at least one terrorist 
attack by ethnic group, and experience civil war at the same time. 
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dominant in the Jammu and Kashmir regions of India, the support for these groups are 
also present among other Muslim minorities in India (Satana, 2013). The Jammu and 
Kashmiri Islamic Front have conducted terrorist attacks in the name of the Kashmir 
Muslim minority. The group used the exclusion from power (and thus Kashmiri rights) 
as a strong mobilizing agent among the Kashmiri minority group in the late 1980s 
(Santana et al., 2013:34). 
Some of the terrorist organizations and ethnic groups have roots in different countries, 
and thus operates across borders. One example of an ethnic group which is represented 
with terrorism in many countries is the Kurds.  The group operates under different 
names and through different organizations in several countries, mainly in the Middle 
East, but also carries out transnational attacks (in e.g. Germany). The Kurdish ethnic 
group has been involved in terrorism in countries like Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey, and 
is thus coded in my dataset. Almost all terrorist events in Turkey have been perpetrated 
by the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). The PKK’s main goal is to establish an independent 
Kurdish state in the south-eastern part of Turkey through a communist revolution. In 
the EPR-ETH the Kurds are coded as being discriminated, which basically means that the 
group is both excluded from power in Turkey39, and also the subject of discriminatory 
policies. The PKK (and other groups with mainly the same goals) is also operating in 
countries like Syria, Iran and Iraq40. The exclusion/ discrimination of the Kurds may 
vary from country and over time.  
Latin America is one of the regions with high numbers of domestic terrorist events in the 
GTD dataset, but the groups represented in the region cannot be described as ethnic per 
se. Many groups do include some ethnic attributes, while the most important 
identity/mobilizing factor is not ethnicity but rather leftist/communist ideology. The 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is a good example of a group that have 
used terrorist tactics for an extensive time period (since the 1960s until today), but the 
group has a clear Marxist/communist ideology, and is therefore not included in the 
                                                        
39 This may be varying over time, but also from country to country. 
40 After the Gulf War in 1991 a Kurdish state was established in the Northern Iraq, which basically has 
given a “safe haven” to groups like the PKK (Derin-Güre, 2011:397). Other groups operating under the 
pretext of Kurdish separatism is e.g. Kurdish Democratic Party, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Unified 
Kurdish Socialist Party.  
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dataset41. The same leftist identity markers can be ascribed to an extensive number of 
groups in Latin America throughout the period.   
4.1.4 The finished dataset and possible limitations  
The finished dataset includes a count-measure of 890 group-years with one or more 
terrorist event(s) in the period 1970-2009, varying from 0-207 events in a group-year. 
Starting from the GTD with a recorded number of about 41.399 observations, my 
finished dataset includes about 14.859 observations.  The distribution of this new data 
seems to propose a shift from Latin-America to Asia42. As mentioned earlier this is 
because the high levels of terrorism in Latin-America are connected to more ideological 
groups. Still, I suppose that this shift and the reduction of observations, should only tell 
us that the different identities and motivations are all equally important. 
As the previous sections have shown, the coding of ethno-nationalist terrorism has 
proved to be a bit challenging. Even though the work may have some possible errors, 
where some groups might have been miss-classified, there should not be any systematic 
“imbalances”. There is no reason to expect that the results are skewed or biased because 
of this. Looking beyond the challenges my data is the first truly global attempt to 
investigate and locate terrorist groups and connect this to geographically defined ethnic 
groups, which also makes it possible to connect it to political and economic status at the 
group-level.   
Figure 2 shows the sum of events for all group-years in the period, notice that 1992 has 
the highest number of terrorist events reaching about 100043. I have also coded a 
variable which only include the attacks where one or more person(s) was killed. The 
number of lethal terrorist attacks is 572 group-years. See Appendix A for a list over 
terrorist groups from GTD and the respective ethnic groups in EPR-ETH.  
                                                        
41 It is not like groups cannot have both a Marxist/leftist ideology and at the same time being ethno-
nationalist, but for most groups in Latin America this is not the case.  
42 The domestic count of terrorism by Enders et al. (2011) reports the highest counts in Latin-America, 
directly followed by Western Europe. In my dataset Asia is directly followed by Western Europe.   
43 Because of the inconsistency and problems connected to the 1993 data, I have opted to remove the data 
from the analysis and description of the variables.  
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Figure 2: Count-measure of ethno-nationalist terrorist events 1970-2009 
 
4.2 Data and variables 
The following section will introduce the operationalization of the dependent, 
independent and control variables used in the empirical analysis. To test the hypotheses 
proposed in Chapter 3, I am using independent variables from two different datasets. At 
the group-level I am using variables derived from Cedeman et al. (2011) and for the 
country-level approach I am using variables derived from Buhaug et al. (2013). The two 
datasets cover the time period from 1946 to 2005, even though my disaggregated 
dataset includes data from 1970-2009, the analysis will include 36 years from 1970-
2005.   
4.2.1 Dependent variable  
The empirical analysis uses four different operationalizations of the dependent variable, 
two at the country-level and two at the group-level. The country-level hypotheses are 
tested using a count of domestic terrorist incidents from 1970-2005. The variable is 
aggregated from the Enders et al. (2011) dataset which has divided the GTD dataset into 
accounts for domestic and transnational terrorism44. The variable ranges from 0 to 524 
                                                        
44 For a detailed step-by-step description of the process see Enders et al. (2011). 
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domestic terrorism events for the years 1970-2005.  Figure 3 shows the distribution of 
the sum of events from 1970-2005. As for the group-level data, we see that the event-
count peaks in 1992, with about 3000 events in a country-year. 
Figure 3: Country-level distribution of domestic terrorist attacks 1970-2005 
 
 
The second variable used to test the hypotheses at the country-level is a dummy for 
terrorist events called GTD-dummy. Contrary to the more common count-variable, this 
variable tells us whether a country experienced a terrorist attack in a given country-
year, and thus may be capturing a different aspect of the terrorism phenomenon, 
namely, risk of terrorism. The variable is coded one for country-years with at least one 
terrorist attack and zero if no terrorist event is recorded. 
The dependent variable in all group-level models will be a dummy variable generated 
from the count-measure in my disaggregated dataset (Section 4.4.3)45. The variable is 
called GTD_dx and is coded in a group-year format that reflects the ethnic groups in the 
EPR-ETH and if this group in some way has been connected to a terrorist event in a 
                                                        
45 As the count measure in the dataset does not provide many groups with levels of terrorism over 1, the 
count measure may not be appropriate, and thus a zinb model at the group-level is not appropriate. 
Cameron and Trievedi (2009:675) describes the phenomenon as “underdispersion, where the counted 
outcome is largely 0 or 1, with a very small number of 2 or more”. 
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given year46. The group-level terrorism measure has a timeframe stretching from 1970-
2005, and records 740 group-years with at least one terrorist event connected to an 
ethnic group. The dummy takes on the value one if the group has been connected to a 
terrorist event, and zero if not, no terrorist attack in a given year was also given a zero 
value. At the group-level I have also included a variable which measures if a given attack 
was fatal or not47. If an attack in a group-year was fatal (one or more dead) it is coded as 
one and zero if not. The variable has 540 observations of ethnic-group years with 
terrorism. Figure 4 shows the distribution for the two dummy variables separately 
(rather than the count-measure in figure 2). 
Figure 4: Group-level distribution of dummies 1970-2005 
 
4.2.2 Independent variables 
Here I will present the main independent variables used in the statistical analysis. 
  
                                                        
46 It is worth noticing that the variable only tells if a terrorist event in any way can be ascribed to an ethnic 
group, and whether “extreme” elements from this ethnic group has used terrorism in a given group-year. 
47 Masters (2008) finds in his analysis of terrorist trends 1970-2005 that terrorism overall is becoming 
more violent and that ethno-nationalist forms of terrorism is the most prevalent both in number of attacks 
and in the death tolls. Masters uses the INTERATE dataset. 
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Political HIs 
To test the first political inequality hypothesis (H1) at the country-level I am using a 
dummy variable capturing excluded groups in each country. The excluded group 
variable from the EPR dataset is a continuous variable ranging from 0-55 groups, which 
measure whether an ethnic group is excluded from executive power. To test the 
country-level hypothesis I construct a dummy variable where if a country possesses at 
least one excluded ethnic group in a country-year is coded as one, and all which do not 
have an excluded group are coded as zero.  
The second political inequality hypothesis at the country-level (H2), the variable used to 
measure inter-group grievances is derived from Buhaug et al. (2013) dataset, this 
variable combine information from the geo-referenced EPR dataset (GeoEPR)48. The 
variable is called largest excluded group (LEG), and combines the demographic size of 
the LEG, relative to the joint size of the excluded group and the group(s) in power 
(Buhaug et al., 2013:20). The variable is bounded within the interval 0 and 1, and in 
regards to the exclusion variable tested in H1 this variable taps differences between the 
size of the groups, rather than if a country possesses an excluded group or not.  
At the group-level the political horizontal inequality hypothesis (H5) will be tested by 
using the excluded group variable from the EPR dataset. This is a dummy variable that 
describes if the group is excluded from central power in a given year and takes on the 
value one for years where the group is excluded from power and zero if not.   
At the group-level I also include a variable which captures a groups’ demographic power 
balance in regard to the group(s) in power49, as a share of the dyadic population. The 
variable is called power-balance and gathered from Cederman et al. (2011) dataset.  I 
expect the variable to have a negative impact on terrorism, because more powerful 
groups may not need to use terrorism to get concessions, whereas small and weak 
groups may have more to gain by using this type of violence. 
                                                        
48 The GeoEPR dataset combines geo-referenced data with the groups from the EPR dataset, and this 
makes it possible to understand group structures on a sub-national level. Wucherpfenning et al., (2011) 
provide ethnic group polygons in GIS shape-file format (Wucherpfenning et al., 2011). 
49 “Formally denoting the group and the ethnic groups in power (EGIPs) as s and S, respectively, the power 
balance is defined as s/(s+S) if the group is excluded, and as s/S otherwise. Small groups thus have close 
to zero share of the population, where those groups that are larger than the EGIP have a power balance 
greater than 0.5 “(Cederman et al., 2011:466). 
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Economic HIs 
The economic inequality hypothesis at the country-level (H3a and H3b) is tested using a 
variable that measure economic horizontal inequality at the country-level, I`m using the 
variables negative horizontal inequality (NHI) and positive horizontal inequality (PHI) 
from Buhaug et al. (2013). This measure takes into account differences between an 
ethnic group`s relative economic status against other groups in the society. Buhaug et al. 
(2013) have calculated group-level data on wealth for all ethnic groups in all countries 
by joining the G-Econ gridded data50  with the GeoEPR, then identifying the richest and 
the poorest ethnic group in each country, and combining this with country-level 
economic indicators. The variables therefore capture the relative gap between the mean 
national level and the income level of the poorest and richest group respectively 
(Buhaug et al., 2013: 18-19). The two variables are computed as negative horizontal 
inequality and positive horizontal inequality, and the operationalization is as follows51:  
Negative horizontal inequality (NHI) = country-level GDP per capita/ mean per capita 
income for poorest group in country.  
Positive horizontal inequality (PHI) = mean per-capita income for richest group/ 
country-level GDP per-capita.   
The group-level inequality measures are also calculated by using data from the G-Econ 
dataset.  
Dividing the total sum of the economic production in the settlement area by the group’s 
population size enables us to derive group-specific measures of per capita income 
production, which can be compared to either the nationwide per capita product or the 
per capita product of privileged groups (Cederman et al., 2011: 485).  
One example of the coding is in Yugoslavia where “the Slovenes get a high score, because 
their settlement region is located in the rich parts of Yugoslavia” (Cederman et al., 
                                                        
50 The G-Econ dataset is generated by Nordhaus et.al (2006), information and codebook can be found at: 
http://gecon.yale.edu/.  
 
51 Because the G-Econ is a static measure (data from 1990) it may be problematic to use the variables in 
years before 1990, but there is still little reason to believe that inequality of the groups have changed 
drastically over the years. What is more probable is that groups do not change economic status 
dramatically, rich groups probably becoming richer, while poor groups do not move op the distribution 
ladder (see Buhaug et al., 2013 for further elaboration on the issue).  
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2011). The group-level (symmetric) inequality hypothesis (H6) is tested using the 
variable Inequality. The symmetric logged variable defines inequality as the “square 
logarithmized ratio between g- the GDP per capita of the ethnic group, and G-the average 
GDP per capita of all groups in the country” (Cederman et al., 2011:486).  
 The variable shows the deviation from the mean for both rich and poor groups present 
in the country. The variable defines a group’s deviation in economic status from the 
country average for both rich and poor groups present in the country, and is coded one 
for groups at the average (both rich and poor). The mathematical operationalization 
looks like this;   
Inequality= [log(g/G)]2. 
The asymmetric economic inequality hypotheses (H7a and H7b) are tested by using the 
poor_group and rich_group asymmetric no logged measure from Cederman et al. (2011). 
The asymmetric measurement captures the relative difference of the richest and poorest 
group from the country average respectively. The operationalization of the variables 
“guarantees that deviations from the country mean are always positive numbers greater 
than one” (Cederman et al., 2011:486). The mathematical term for the two variables 
respectively;  
poor_group= G/g if g<G,  
rich_group=G/g if g>G,  
Where G is the country GDP per capita and g is the GDP of the group.  For example, a 
group that is twice as wealthy as the average has poor_group=1 and rich_group=2, and a 
group that is three times as poor as the average has poor_group=3 and rich_group=1 
(Cederman et al., 2011:486)52.  
4.2.3 Control variables  
Although the models are primarily designed to assess the relationship between political 
and economic horizontal inequality and terrorism, it is important to include other 
structural factors that might be connected to terrorist activity and/or reduce the 
                                                        
52“Despite considerable wealth discrepancies between peripheral and central areas, the Nordhaus data 
exhibit very limited variation, because of underlying data quality issues”( Cederman et al., 2011). For a 
thorough step by step explanation of how the variables are produced see Cederman et al. (2011:485-486).   
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likelihood of spurious effects. In addition to the main independent variables introduced 
above the analysis will include variables commonly used in the empirical research on 
terrorism.  
GDP per capita 
The first control variable included in the analysis is a logged GDP per capita variable 
which captures the economic activity in a given country per year. Note that this variable 
does not account for any distributional factors or inequality, just the capital flows in the 
country (Penn World Tables 6.3)53. The GDP level is often used as a proxy for economic 
development (and thus poverty) in analyses of economic factors and terrorism.  As the 
discussion of economic factors and terrorism revealed (in Section 2.2) there is not any 
agreement on whether or not higher levels of GDP per capita will deter or induce 
terrorism. Based on the discussion I expect that the GDP per capita is positively 
connected to terrorism. 
Democracy 
Democracy is a common indicator of terrorism. The literature has not come to any 
conclusions about the connection between terrorism and democracy, whether or not 
democracy is enabling or reducing terrorism is an ongoing debate between scholars of 
the terrorism-democracy nexus (see Section 2.2). Based on this discussion two dummy 
variables are generated from the Polity IV project, which ranges from -10 (autocracy) to 
10 (full democracy). The variables used in the analysis show whether the country is a 
democracy (Polity2>6) or anocracy (-6≤ Polity2 ≤ 6). Both variables should be positively 
connected to democracy, as democracy gives opportunities for terrorist group formation 
and function (e.g. civil liberties). The anocracy dummy is also proposed to be positively 
connected to terrorism, as semi-democracies (or transitional regimes) are supposed to 
be the most unstable, this type of system provides fertile ground for grievances and 
mobilization for terror (e.g. Eyerman, 1998; Li, 2005). 
  
                                                        
53 https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php. 
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Population size and geographical area 
One of the most robust findings in the literature is that terrorism is more likely in 
populous countries (e.g. Krieger & Meierriecks, 2011; Freytag el al., 2011; Eyerman, 
1998). Eyerman (1998) argue that geographical area and population size is an 
important factor when describing terrorism. Larger countries (geographically) will 
experience more terrorism, as the government is less apt to control all parts of the 
country. This gives ample opportunities for terrorist groups to mobilize and plan 
attacks.  Smaller states should be able to constrain terrorism because they are able to 
“monitor” the population (Eyerman, 1998; Piazza, 2011). Therefore, a logged 
geographical area and population size variable, both from Penn World Tables 6.3, are 
included in the country-level analysis.  
The group-level analysis will include a measure of group size rather than controlling for 
the whole population. The variable is included to control for the effects of groupsize on 
the probability of terrorism by ethnic group. Groupsize is an important factor for 
political violence (e.g. resource mobilization theory in civil war literature/political 
violence see e.g. Cederman et al. (2011), therefore I postulate that the size of a group not 
necessarily is an important factor when it comes to terrorism, as the groups may not 
have to be large to mobilize. I believe that the larger groups not necessarily have a 
higher probability for engaging in terrorist actions.  
A variable measuring the number of excluded groups in a country is also included in the 
group-level analysis. This is a continuous variable ranging from 1- 55. I expect that this 
variable will have a negative relationship with terrorism; this is because a state which 
faces a large amount of excluded groups may be less willing to agree to concessions to 
some groups because of a fear of a “domino-effect”. The firmness from the state might 
deter other groups from terrorism (in relation to ethno-nationalist civil war see 
Cederman et al., 2011 and Walter, 2006).  
Since I am operating with time-series data all independent variables are lagged one year 
to control for time dependence. 
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Controls for statistical dependence  
One of the assumptions for regression models is that the observations are independent 
of each other. Since the data I am using have a cross-sectional time-series format, the 
units (group and country-years) are likely to be dependent on each other. A violation of 
the assumption of independence in the data may lead to biased and overly significant 
results (Beck et al., 1998). As my dependent variables are binary I have a binary time 
series cross sectional data format (BTSCS)54. It is highly likely that one terrorist event is 
connected to the levels of terrorism in the preceding year. To control for this 
dependency Beck el al., (1998) propose a method using a temporal lag and natural cubic 
splines (time splines). The natural cubic splines capture the decreasing risk of a terrorist 
event as a function of time. The temporal lag variable controls for time since last 
terrorist event at the country-level and time since last terrorist attack by ethnic group at 
the group level. In addition, three cubic splines are included in all analyses. 
4.3  Statistical method 
Because the dependent variables in the analysis have different operationalizations I am 
applying two different models. In the following section I am introducing the two 
different models used. First, to analyze the binary dependent variables both at country 
and group-level an ordinary logistic regression will be used. Second, to analyze the 
continuous (count) variable at the country-level I am applying a zero-inflated negative 
binominal regression model55. The two different operationalizations help me answer 
two different questions, namely severity or frequency (zinb) and risk or probability 
(logit) of terrorism. 
4.3.1 Logistic regression 
As the main part of my analysis looks at the factors which make ethnic groups use 
terrorism at both national and group level, the main part of my statistical analysis will 
include logistic regression models (herafter logit).  The dependent variable in the 
analysis is dichotomous terrorist event (1) and non event (0). Therefore I am applying a 
                                                        
54 The BTSCS model, using a binary dependent variable in time-series data; P (y i,t=1) = ⨍(x i,t,yi,1,…,yi,t-
1,…,xi,t-1), i= 1,…,N,t=1,…,T  (Beck et al., 1998). 
55 All models are run with STATA 12. 
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logistic regression model56. The logit model gives us the probability of the dependent 
variable being 1 (Hamilton 1992:220), ergo that a group has been connected to a 
terrorist event in a given year for the group level, and if a country has experience 
terrorism in one country year for the national level57.  
At the group-level I am applying a logit model (not using the count-variable discussed in 
Section 4.3.4), this is because the distribution of the events at the group-level does not 
necessarily propose that we use a count-model. This is because there is quite few group-
year with groups represented with count of terrorism higher than 1, ergo we have 
“underdispersion” of counts. Therefore it does not seem reasonable to use the count 
measure at the group level.  
4.3.2 Zero-inflated negative binominal regression  
The method used to analyze the dependent count variable at the country-level is a zero-
inflated negative binominal regression (zinb), which is a mixed-methods model 
(Cameron & Trievedi, 2005; 2009). Because the distribution of the dependent (count) 
variable is not normal (see figure 5), the assumptions for the OLS regression model are 
not followed (approximately normal distribution).  
Figure 5 shows that the distribution is far from normal, and that the distribution pattern 
follows a non normal Poisson distribution58. Also, the terrorist events variable is highly 
overdispersed59, which means that there is an extensive number of zero observations in 
                                                        
56 As the terrorism data is rare events a Rare Events Logistic Regression (relogit) model could have been 
applied to control for the excessive number of zero counts in the data. The Relogit model was first 
proposed by King & Zeng (2001) and thus controls for the fact that ordinary logit models may give biased 
estimates if applied to data on rare events. King & Zeng (2001) propose the use of the Relogit model in 
cases where the number of observations are lower than 200, since my dependent variables all have values 
higher than this, I have opted to use the regular logit model.  Estimation of Relogit models gives me the 
same results as when using the Logit model. 
57 Log (Pit/(1-Pit)= α+βXit+eit. Where α is the intercept (Y), βX is the explanatory variables used with their 
coefficients, e is the random error terms for country i at time t. The logit equation is specified as:  
Li=β0+β1Xi1+β2Xi2+…+βk-1Xik-1 
58 Poisson distribution: “the natural stochastic model for counts is a Poisson point process for the 
occurrence of the event, with density, or more formally probability mass function, Pr[Y=y] = e-μ μy/y!, 
y=0,1,2,….,  where μ is the intensity or rate parameter” (Cameron & Trievedi, 2005:668).  
59“…overdispesion, and in some cases underdispersion, may arise because the process generating the first 
event may differ from that determining later events. Overdispersion in count data may also be due to 
failure of the assumption of independence of events, which is implicit in the Poisson process (Cameron & 
Trievedi, 2009: 674).  
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the data, which may lead to biased coefficients and interpretations if not controlled for 
(Cameron & Trievedi, 2005). To account for both the Poisson (non-normal) distribution 
and the excessive number of zero counts, I am applying the zinb model. Cameron and 
Trivedi (2005:681) proposes this method because;“(…) this lets the zero counts occur in 
two ways; as a realization of the binary process and as a realization of the count process 
when the binary variable takes value 1”. Thus we get one model which shows the 
probability of a country experiencing terrorist events in a given year, and a second 
(inflated) model which only shows the certain zeroes.  The count model is the equivalent 
of the negative binominal regression model (nbreg), while the inflate model accounts for 
the excessive zeros which may not be captured in the nbreg model (Hilbe, 2011).  
Drakos and Gofas (2006a) also propose the model, to control for bias in the dependent 
variable when looking at event-count of terrorism60.  
Figure 5: Country-level distribution of events 
 
 
  
                                                        
60 The expected count will be expressed as: E (n terrorist events=k)=P(no terrorist event)*0+p(terrorist 
event)*E(y=k terrorist event). 
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4.4 Data summary  
Table 1 includes descriptive statistics for all independent and dependent variables used 
in the analysis.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
Observations Mean Std.Dev Minimum Maximum 
Country-level variables  
     Terrorism event count 5520 7.721 33.41 0 524 
Terrorism dummy 5353 .3429 .4747 0 1 
Excluded 4738 .6768 .4677 0 1 
Largest excluded group  6027 .1188 .2120 0 .98 
Positive horizontal inequality 6027 1.184 .7552 1 9.634 
Negative horizontal inequality  6027 1.200 .5092 1 6.045 
Anocracy  4822 .2005 .4004 0 1 
Democracy  4822 .3836 .4863 0 1 
Population  5474 1.926 1.744 -2.813 7.174 
Area  5628 11.92 2.168 5.703 16.64 
GDP per capita 4876 1.339 1.147 -2.085 4.173 
Time since last terror attack  5520 4.508 6.371 0 35 
_spline1  5520 -1157 4172 -42875 0 
_spline2 5520 -250.2 607.9 -4488 0 
_spline3 5520 -564.2 1573 -12348 0 
      Group-level variables  
     Terrorism by ethnic group  18711 .0393 .1945 0 1 
Fatal terrorism by ethnic 
group  18711 .0292 .1684 0 1 
Excluded 19105 .5898 .4918 0 1 
Power balance  19280 .2765 .3458 .000 1 
Inequality  17349 1.032 .2488 1 5.131 
Poor ethnic group  17349 1.226 .5366 1 6.045 
Rich ethnic group  17349 1.097 .4725 1 9.634 
Anocracy  18864 .2170 .4122 0 1 
Democracy  18864 .2949 .4560 0 1 
Number of excluded groups  19280 10.46 16.71 0 55 
GDP per capita 
 
8.035 1.091 4.808 11.12 
Groupsize  19138 .1859 .2638 .0001 1 
Time since last terror attack 
by ethnic group  19259 10.19 9.838 0 35 
_spline1  19292 -813.5 1156 -4488 0 
_spline2  19292 -2010 3115 -1234 0 
_spline3  19292 -2180 3842 -1621 0 
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5.  Empirical Analysis 
This chapter is divided into two parts, first introducing the country-level analysis and 
explaining the differences seen in the models (logit and zinb). The country-level analysis 
is included in this thesis because the share of most newly published articles on terrorism 
uses the cross-country approach in their analysis (as mentioned earlier Chapter 4) this 
gives me the opportunity to compare the results to previous research. The two level 
approach also give opportunity to say something about the universality of the results, 
and whether previous research have been able to explain group-level factors. The 
second part introduces the new disaggregated approach, and models with group-year as 
unit of analysis. This operationalization makes it possible to investigate the causal 
relationship between horizontal inequality and ethno-nationalist terrorism.  
All models are run with robust standard errors clustered on country, to control for 
country-level dependence, and all independent variables are lagged one period for time-
dependence, reducing the possibility for reverse causality. So that for example the 
previous year’s level of GDP per capita predicts the current probability of terrorism. 
Further tests and analyses can be found in the Appendix B. 
5.1 Testing HIs at the country-level 
The first model at the country-level is the zero-inflated negative binominal model with 
the count measure of terrorism61.  As mentioned in Chapter 4, Table 2 show both a 
negative binominal model (referred to here as the count-model (non-certain zero), and 
an inflated model (certain zero). The count- model thus shows the increase in number of 
events with an increase in the explanatory variable. The certain-zero models can be 
interpreted as the probability of not experiencing terrorism, ergo accounting for the 
overdispersion. A negative result thus means that there is a positive likelihood of 
experiencing at least one terrorist attack in a given year62.  The number of observations 
                                                        
61 The Voung test suggests that the fit of the Zinb model is significantly better to explain the levels of 
terrorism than the more conventional negative binominal model (nbreg). The zinb is also preferred over 
the zero-inflated poisson model. 
62 There is some debate on whether or not to include all variables in the inflated model and how to best 
operationalize it. Following in line with previous studies, I have opted to keep the model with all variables 
included (as also done by Piazza, 2011; Findley, Piazza & Young; 2012). I have tested the models with only 
those variables connected to experiencing a zero count (in this case democracy) proposed by among 
others Li (2005) and Drakos & Gofas (2006a; 2006b). Further I have run some initial model-fit estimation 
which is presented in the Appendix B.  
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ranges from 4515 to 4647 for 147 countries pending on model specifications. This is due 
to list-wise deletion when one (or several) of the x variables have missing values.  
Table 2 includes four models where H1 to H4 are tested. Model 1 tests the first 
hypothesis (H1) that postulates that countries with an excluded ethnic group will have 
higher levels of domestic terrorism. The inclusion of the dummy for countries exhibiting 
at least one excluded ethnic group does not yield significant results in the count model. 
The variable is not significant at the conventional level, but the positive direction is as 
expected. When looking at the inflated model we see that the variable is negative and 
significant (-0.995). This therefore tells us that the excluded variable is more apt to 
explain the probability of experiencing at least one attack in a country, rather that higher 
rates of terrorism. Piazza (2011; 2012) uses a dummy for the relationship between 
minority group facing discrimination and domestic terrorism, he finds a positive and 
significant relationship (p<0.001). My results do indicate the same relationship, but the 
results are far from as significant. This may again be prescribed to Piazzas use of MAR 
variables, which may show overly significant results (as discussed in Chapter 2). 
Looking briefly at the controls only anocracy, democracy and population is significant 
throughout the models. The controls basically behave as expected, although area has a 
negative sign, which I proposed would be positive.  
To test the second hypothesis (H2) Model 2 introduces the political HI variable, the 
largest discriminated group from Buhaug et al. (2013).  This variable is a proxy for the 
difference between the largest excluded group and the groups in power. The variable 
captures the logic of the HI argument, proposing that inequality in political status 
between groups will increase the probability for conflict and political violence. As 
opposed to the excluded group variable the largest discriminated group variable is 
significant at the 0.1 level. This suggests that although having at least one politically 
relevant ethnic group- by itself does not increase the levels of terrorism (Model 1), 
higher inequality between the political opportunities of the ethnic groups increase the 
levels of terrorism. It is therefore higher frequency of terrorism in countries where there 
is a relative discrepancy in power access between the largest excluded ethnic group and 
the group(s) in power. This is an interesting and novel observation as previous research 
on terrorism has not been able to capture the inter-group difference that this variable 
proposes.  
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Up to this point only the political aspect of the HI argument have been tested, Model 3 
introduces the variables testing economic HIs. Model3 tests both H3a and H3b, and thus 
captures the asymmetrical relationship between economic inequality and terrorism. The 
variables measuring economic HIs positive economic inequality and negative economic 
inequality are included in the analysis63, and captures the effect of the discrepancy 
between rich and poor groups from the average (GDP per cap) separately. Contrary to 
what was expected we see that the positive economic inequality variable is highly 
significant (p<0.005) and negative, and this proposes that countries with one ethnic 
group being richer than the country average reduce the levels of terrorism. From the 
literature on terrorism I expected that both positive and negative economic HIs would 
have a positive impact on terrorism (e.g. in relation to the Sikhs in Punjab), although the 
negative effect may be due to the fact that we run the analysis on a wide range of 
countries, and that the effect is not as expected because we have so many cases where 
this has no effect64.  Horowitz (1985) also states this by amplifying that in most cases it 
is the poorest groups that in most cases turn to violence.   
Model 4 includes both measures of economic and political HIs in the model, shows that 
both the largest excluded group variable and the positive economic inequality are 
significant, while the negative economic inequality measure is still not significant at the 
conventional levels. Including an interaction between the two did not yield any 
significant results. This proposes that the H4 is not confirmed at the country-level, and 
that the variables have an effect on levels of terrorism but that they operate independent 
from each other. 
 
  
                                                        
63 The effects of the economic inequality measures should be interpreted with some care, as there might 
be some differences when the most unequal societies (Russia, Thailand and Argentina) are dropped from 
the analysis. The results for the “final” models for both country and group-level can be found in Appendix 
B. The results are largely the same when the countries are dropped from the analysis.  
64Running the model without Saudi Arabia which is an outlier (in regard to the PHI variable), the PHI 
variable lose its significance.  
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Table 2: Zinb-models country-level 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Count Model (non-certain zero) 
    Excluded 0.629 
   
 
(0.708) 
   Largest excluded group 
 
1.981* 
 
1.997* 
  
(1.169) 
 
(1.117) 
Positive economic inequality 
  
-0.434*** -0.445*** 
   
(0.102) (0.105) 
Negative economic inequality 
  
0.144 0.192 
   
(0.280) (0.231) 
Anocracy 0.920** 0.601 0.870** 0.614* 
 
(0.375) (0.378) (0.356) (0.352) 
Democracy 0.986* 0.565 0.884* 0.569 
 
(0.566) (0.498) (0.533) (0.452) 
Population 0.386* 0.583*** 0.413** 0.575*** 
 
(0.204) (0.216) (0.184) (0.176) 
Area -0.134 -0.231 -0.0500 -0.225 
 
(0.165) (0.196) (0.187) (0.203) 
GDP per capita 0.159 0.310 0.207 0.308 
 
(0.236) (0.228) (0.239) (0.213) 
Constant 1.618 2.471 1.239 2.660 
 
(1.869) (2.147) (2.035) (2.150) 
Inflated Logit (certain zero) 
    Excluded -0.995* 
   
 
(0.518) 
   Largest excluded group 
 
-0.547 
 
-0.220 
  
(0.880) 
 
(0.974) 
Positive economic inequality 
  
-0.434*** -1.221 
   
(0.102) (0.814) 
Negative economic inequality 
  
0.144 -3.746*** 
   
(0.280) (1.240) 
Anocracy -1.379*** -1.949*** 0.870** -2.051*** 
 
(0.459) (0.621) (0.356) (0.600) 
Democracy -0.962** -1.289*** 0.884* -1.273*** 
 
(0.455) (0.481) (0.533) (0.414) 
Population -0.928*** -0.900*** 0.413** -0.854*** 
 
(0.264) (0.271) (0.184) (0.208) 
Area 0.249 0.153 -0.050 0.290* 
 
(0.168) (0.188) (0.187) (0.153) 
GDP per capita -0.238 -0.224 0.207 -0.213 
 
(0.219) (0.254) (0.239) (0.240) 
Constant -0.263 0.410 1.239 4.021** 
 
(1.799) (2.077) (2.035) (2.045) 
Observations 4,515 4,647 4,647 4,647 
Nonzero Observations 1693 1715 1715 1715 
Zero Observations 2822 2932 2932 2932 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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     5.1.1 Logit models at the country-level 
In this section I introduce the logit models at the country level. Conversely to the former 
zinb models which predict higher rates of terrorism in a country-year, the logit models 
show the probability of experiencing terrorism in a given country-year. All logit models 
include time since last terror event and three cubic spines, as a control for time 
dependence in the data (as discussed in Chapter 4)65. 
An overall look at the logit models shows us that the results are generally more 
significant. This may be because the logit models show risk for experiencing terrorism, 
rather than higher severity or rates of terrorism. Ergo it is possible that the variables are 
more apt to explain risk of terrorism, rather than higher rates. 
Model 5 tests the H1 at the country levels (with the same variables as in Model 1).The 
model shows us that running the same variables, but only looking at the probability of 
experiencing a terrorist attack, is positively and significantly higher in countries with at 
least one excluded ethnic group. This thus verifies the hypothesis which suggests that 
countries with an ethnic group will have higher likelihood of experiencing terrorism. All 
control variables are significant and show the same direction as in the zinb model. 
Generally it seems to be the case that the HI argument is stronger if we want to predict 
terrorism in a country, rather than if we want to look at why some countries have higher 
frequency terrorism. 
Model 6 tests H2, and thus shows that the results from the logit model give higher 
probability for terrorism when controlling for the largest excluded group in country, 
ergo a higher degree of political marginalization. 
                                                        
65 These controls for statistical dependence are not included in the zinb model, because the model in itself 
is supposed to control for time dependence (Cameron & Trievedi, 2009). 
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Table 3: Logit models country-level 
 
As in Model 3, Model 7 also includes the two economic variables separately, and 
captures the effect of the two without controlling for political exclusion. In Model 7 I 
have only included variables measuring economic HIs, the variables do show the 
expected direction, but is far from conventional levels of significance. Conversely to the 
zinb model, where the positive economic inequality variable was significant, the variable 
is not significant when testing it on the probability of experiencing terror. As we see 
none of the economic inequality variables reach statistical significance, further 
 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
     Excluded 0.518*** 
   
 
(0.132) 
   Largest excluded group 
 
0.822*** 
 
0.854*** 
  
(0.230) 
 
(0.230) 
Positive economic inequality 
  
-0.0554 -0.076** 
   
(0.041) (0.038) 
Negative economic inequality 
  
0.159 0.177* 
   
(0.104) (0.099) 
Anocracy 0.673*** 0.743*** 0.728*** 0.740*** 
 
(0.132) (0.137) (0.136) (0.136) 
Democracy 0.533*** 0.597*** 0.538*** 0.597*** 
 
(0.115) (0.129) (0.129) (0.133) 
Population 0.363*** 0.440*** 0.403*** 0.422*** 
 
(0.057) (0.057) (0.059) (0.057) 
Area -0.104** -0.119*** -0.112** -0.126*** 
 
(0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.044) 
GDP per capita 0.130** 0.175*** 0.132** 0.171*** 
 
(0.051) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) 
GTD time since last attack -1.001*** -0.919*** -0.928*** -0.918*** 
 
(0.064) (0.061) (0.060) (0.0613) 
_spline1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
_spline2 -0.038*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
_spline3 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.0600 0.0708 0.166 0.0750 
 
(0.501) (0.483) (0.495) (0.485) 
Observations 4515 4647 4647 4647 
Robust standard errors  in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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proposing that the effect of economic factors are not as strong as the political exclusion 
effect on terrorism (when looking at probability and levels).   
Model 8 includes both the political HI variable and the two asymmetric economic 
inequality measures. The model shows that when the economic HI variables are 
controlled for in the same model as political HIs, the effect is significant; richest group 
being significant at 0.005 and having a highly economically marginalized groups are 
more prone to terrorism (P<0.01) 66. As we have seen throughout the models there are 
some uncertainty connected to the PHI and NHI variables. Although the PHI variable 
seems to be highly significant, the effect is much lower than for the NHI if we look at the 
coefficients and standard error.  The other control variables are unaffected by the 
difference in models. Because of the marginal and non-significant effects of the economic 
inequalities variables alone (in models without the political inequality measure) this 
begs me to question if the effects of the economic HIs are in some way dependent on the 
political HI variable (as proposed by Stewart, 2008). Therefore I am including an 
interaction to see if this is the case (see Appendix B). The model with interaction 
between the economic inequality measure and exclusion did not yield any significant 
results. Thus it seems that the effects of the two are not dependent on each other, and 
that the economic and political effects operate separately. H7 is therefore rejected in the 
logit model. 
5.1.2  Summary for country-level analysis 
Generally the country-level models/approach give some support for my general 
hypothesis, postulating that horizontal inequality between ethnic groups have 
potentially great importance when explaining domestic terrorism. 
The effects of the different proxies for HIs on events (zinb) do not seem to be as strong 
as for the results found in the logit models. The structural factors (HIs) operate as a 
precondition for terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981; Ross, 1993) and in this case it seems that 
these are better apt to explain risk of terrorism, rather than higher frequency.  The 
question then becomes if a couple of terrorist attacks are really that important if we 
                                                        
66 Saudia Arabia has the group which is furthest from the average economically. The Ja’afai Shia group has 
a PHI level of 9.63. The Ja’afari group is also excluded from power in Saudi Arabia.  The country has 
experienced about 9 domestic terrorist events in the period 1970-2005. Removing Saudi Arabia from the 
analysis changes the significance of the PHI variable (See Appendix B).  
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want to say something about the root causes of terrorism?  One possible answer here is 
that looking at probability is perhaps more intuitive, especially if we want to target 
specific risk factors across countries.  
Conversely to what I expected I did not seem to find a robust effect of negative economic 
inequality, as I proposed in H3a. I expected that countries with poor ethnic groups would 
have higher probability of terrorism and that this would be a strong predictor of higher 
levels of terrorism (as was found by Piazza, 2011; 2012). Although the variable had a 
positive effect throughout all model specifications, the effect was not significant (only 
weak effect in Model 8). Why is this so? This seems to be somewhat in “tune” with 
previous research, where effects of poverty only have a weak positive connection 
(Blomberg & Hess, 2008; Lai, 2007) or no/an connection dependent on other factors 
(Piazza, 2006; Krueger & Malekova, 2003; Krueger, 2007; Enders & Hoover, 2012). 
Therefore these unexpected results may be due to aggregating the effects of poverty on a 
large scale, and that the effect of poverty is better explained when looking specifically at 
the group-level.   
As discussed Chapter 4 (Section 4.2) aggregating all terrorist types into one variable can 
potentially mask important differences in effects that only prescribe to some specific 
types of terrorism, the next section therefore introduces models testing my hypotheses 
5 through 8 with my new disaggregated data. 
5.2 Testing HIs at the group-level 
This section introduces the logit models at the group level, with my new disaggregated 
data. The disaggregated dependent variable used in the analysis is binary whether or not 
a group engaged in terrorism in a given group-year. All models include the most 
important control from the literature and the variables to control for time dependence. 
The models are run with an option only to include relevant group-years; this is because 
it is not necessary to run the analysis for years when the ethnic group was not relevant 
in the country since my data depicts politically relevant ethnic groups.  
The group-level models are presented with both “all terrorist attacks by ethnic group” 
and only including fatal terrorist attacks. The analysis yields about 455 groups or 17 775 
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group years, with 773 observations of terrorist attacks by ethnic group (=1), and 547 
observations of terrorist actions being fatal (=1) for 120 countries around the world.  
Table 3 presents the group-level results. The first model (Model 9) tests H5, whether 
groups that are excluded from central power are more likely to be engaged in a terrorist 
attack than included groups. The effects are substantial and highly significant at 0.005, 
suggesting that excluded groups more often participate in terrorist activity. Notice that 
there is a possibility of reversed causality in this case, as the marginalization may reflect 
not only past terrorism, but also past conflict. I have discussed in previous chapters 
(Section 2.2.2) that there seems to be a positive connection between terrorism and civil 
war/conflict. Ergo, we might have a case where terrorism by an ethnic group is again 
making the state impose even harder restrictions on the group. One example of this can 
be found in Myanmar, where ethnic tensions are strong among the many ethnic groups. 
In the process of democratization the government in Myanmar has signed peace 
agreements with all the major insurgent groups, but not with the Kachin Independence 
Army (KIA). The Kachin ethnic group is fighting for autonomy for the Kachin State and 
elements from the group have been involved in terrorism in Myanmar (the group is 
coded as excluded in the EPR dataset). The problem is that repression from the state 
may lead groups, like the Kachins, to use terrorism (or other types of violence), which 
again makes the state tighten the leash and repress the group even more. Following this 
line of argumentation, whether or not the causal relationship is direct, does not mean 
that the results are less valid in regards to counter-terrorism policies (R.C, 2013).  
Figure 6 show the predicted probabilities (calculated from model 14) of terrorism by 
ethnic group against the excluded dummy. As we see the relationship proposes that the 
probability of terrorism is much higher for excluded groups than those included. The 
dotted lines show 95% upper and lower bound confidence intervals. All other variables 
are held at their mean values. 
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Figure 6: Predicted probability of terrorism by ethnic group against excluded group 
dummy 
 
Further, the control variables mostly behave as expected. The power-balance variable is 
significant at the lowest level (p<0.1), and has a negative effect on the probability of 
terrorism by ethnic group. This thus reflects that the more powerful groups do not need 
to use terrorism, but rather use more conventional measures for political 
influence/participation. I expected this, as the result is also found by Cederman et al. 
(2011) in relation to ethno-nationalist civil war. The group-size has a positive impact on 
the probability of terrorism, indicating that larger groups do have higher probability of 
being connected to a terrorist event. My initial assumption was that group-size was not 
as big a factor for terrorism in relation to other types of violence, as terrorism is seen as 
a low intensity form of violence. But my results show that larger groups seem to have a 
positive and significantly higher probability of engaging in terrorism. One way to look at 
this is that larger groups have higher capacity to overcome mobilization obstacles, as the 
group has capacity to recruit members from a large subset of individuals (note that 
there is a strong positive correlation between power-balance and group-size). What is 
probable from this is that weak groups (hence the negative effect of the power-balance 
variable) do not need to be small in size, to mobilize for terrorism. The other control 
0
.005
.01
.015
fo
r 
G
T
D
_
d
x
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
excluded
Predicted Value 95% CI
P
re
d
ic
te
d
 P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ti
e
s
 a
n
d
 9
5
%
 C
I
73 
 
variables behave as expected, the GDP per capita is positive and the two polity variables 
show the same relationship as they did at the country-level, namely positive. 
The number of excluded groups in the country has a negative impact on terrorism, this 
does confirm my initial belief that countries where there are many excluded groups the 
state may be less open for concessions, and that this deter the groups from using 
terrorism. This might be exemplified by what Moscow has done in regards to the 
Chechens applying strict and hard-line measures to counter terror and insurgency 
(Cederman et al., 2011). Figure 7 shows the predicted probabilities of terrorism at 
varying numbers of excluded groups in the country. The probabilities are calculated 
from Model 1467.  All other covariates are held at their mean values. From this graph we 
see the relationship between number of excluded groups and the probability of 
terrorism68.  
Figure 7: Predicted probability of terrorism by ethnic group by number of excluded 
groups 
                                                        
67 The error bands (confidence intervals) are wide but clearly far from zero in the models, which makes 
me more confident about my results in both Figure 6 and Figure 7. 
68 All post estimations are calculated with Spost9 (Long & Freese, 2001; 2006). 
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Table 4: Group-level models  
 
Model9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
 
all fatal all fatal all fatal 
  
Group-level variables 
   Excluded 1.435*** 1.600*** 1.511*** 1.639*** 1.470*** 1.575*** 
 
(0.264) (0.380) (0.286) (0.402) (0.291) (0.402) 
Power balance -1.168* -1.097 -1.638** -1.592* -1.407* -1.273 
 
(0.669) (0.754) (0.755) (0.823) (0.728) (0.815) 
Group size 1.780** 2.134** 1.679 2.083* 1.507 1.824* 
 
(0.892) (0.832) (1.203) (1.147) (1.153) (1.097) 
Inequality 
  
0.493 0.675 
  
   
(0.472) (0.496) 
  Poorest group 
    
0.558** 0.681** 
     
(0.259) (0.292) 
Richest group 
    
-0.166 -0.298 
     
(0.206) (0.490) 
Country-level  variables 
Anocracy 0.472** 0.516** 0.425* 0.481* 0.343 0.369 
 
(0.223) (0.250) (0.223) (0.258) (0.231) (0.271) 
Democracy 0.833*** 1.074*** 0.814*** 1.052*** 0.759*** 0.977*** 
 
(0.221) (0.274) (0.219) (0.278) (0.227) (0.298) 
       Number of excluded 
groups -0.0720*** -0.065*** -0.083*** -0.077*** -0.098*** -0.097*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.027) 
GDP pr. capita 0.0567 -0.062 0.220* 0.0876 0.195 0.049 
 
(0.095) (0.124) (0.119) (0.139) (0.122) (0.137) 
  
Group-level terror history 
  
Terror_time  -0.396*** -0.365*** -0.457*** -0.425*** -0.476*** -0.448*** 
 
(0.093) (0.116) (0.089) (0.108) (0.088) (0.109) 
_spline1 0.014* 0.018 0.009 0.012 0.007 0.010 
 
(0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) 
_spline2 -0.011*** -0.012** -0.007** -0.009* -0.007** -0.008* 
 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
_spline3 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant -3.311*** -3.052*** -4.831*** -4.638*** -4.499*** -3.986*** 
 
(0.844) (1.164) (0.967) (1.224) (0.916) (1.064) 
Observations 17,775 17,775 16,181 16,181 16,181 16,181 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Having considered H5 on all recoded terrorist attacks by ethnic group, Model 10 
introduces the same variables but now only including the fatal attacks. The analysis 
shows that the effects are largely the same, and that the strong positive effect of 
exclusion remains. The only difference is that the power-balance variable loses its 
significance but the effect remains negative.  The GDP per capita variable behaves a little 
different though now being negative, but the variable is far from significant and not 
strong, which makes me question if we can rely on the negative sign.  
Model 11 introduces the symmetric inequality measure and thus tests H6. The variable is 
not statistically significant, but proposes that groups with wealth levels far from the 
average will be more inclined to use terrorism. Introducing the variable to the model 
does not change the general pattern from the Model 9 and 10, but the group-size 
variable loses its significance. It is also worth noting that the GDP per capita variable is 
now significant (p<0.1) and positive, suggesting that the overall GDP per capita level is 
of more importance when explaining terrorist attacks by ethnic group, and that the 
symmetric inequality variable. GDP per capita in this case, may be able to explain more 
of the variation than the inequality measure, but the variable is just barely reaching 
statistical significance. As we have seen throughout all models the GDP per capita is not 
especially robust to the inclusion of other variables.  
Model 12 introduces the same variables but now only with fatal events. From model 11 
we see that the inequality measure was not significant, but that the GDP per capita had a 
relatively small effect on terrorism by ethnic group, this is not the case when looking 
only at fatal attacks. We see that the results for most part remain the same, although the 
power-balance variable is now significant (hence the results from model 10). The same 
goes for the group-size variable, which was not significant in Model 11.  
By now I have only considered the symmetric inequality variable, which proposes that 
the effect of inequality is the same for poor and rich groups respectively. This may be an 
implausible assumption, so Hypothesis H7a and H7b are tested separately in Model 13 
and 14. Both models show that the asymmetric economic inequality variable is behaving 
as expected. The poor ethnic group variable indicats that a group is below average GDP 
per capita of the population is significant and positively related to terrorism69. This thus 
                                                        
69 The correlation between number of ethnic groups and poorest excluded group is around -0.04. 
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follows in line with what was found at the country-level (Model 8). The reversed 
causality effect may also be present when we look at the positive and significant effect of 
a group experiencing economic marginalization. The economic position may have 
become worse after previous terrorism (or even war) as terrorism often occurs in 
countries with a long history of political violence. But as Buhaug et al. (2013:9) point 
out, the elevated risk of (political violence) terrorism due to economic inequality is of 
interest and importance for policy makers regardless of the underlying reasons for this 
discrepancy. The variable capturing the richest groups shows a negative but not 
significant effect on terrorism. Further confirming what was found at the country level; 
the effects of being better off than the average, do not give higher probability of using 
terrorism  
Figure 8 shows the predicted effect of economically marginalized groups on the levels of 
terrorism, with all other covariates held at their mean values. The figure shows that the 
probability of terrorism is highest at 6 on the poor-group scale, which indicates the 
groups furthest away from the country average (e.g. the poorest ethnic group) have 
higher probability of using terrorism. The dotted lines show the upper and lower bound 
95% confidence intervals. This is supported by evidence from for example Northern-
Ireland, where the unequal distribution of resources is found to have a positive effect on 
mobilization for terrorism (O’Hearn, 1987; Stewart, 2008). This is also confirmed in my 
data, where the groups (both Catholics and Protestants) in Northern Ireland are 
substantially poorer than the average in the UK. Both groups are also excluded from 
power in the dataset. 
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Figure 8: Predicted probability of terrorism by ethnic group at different levels of the 
poor group variable. 
 
 
As was found at the country-level the effect of the economic HI variables seems to be 
stronger when included together with the political exclusion variables. Therefore I have 
tested the hypothesis proposed by Stewart (2008) that where all four (economic, social, 
political and cultural) work together the risk of conflict or violence is highest, testing H8. 
The interactions between the economic and political inequality measure did not yield 
any significant results (see Appendix B). Therefore it seems like the effect of exclusion 
and economic inequality does not depend on the level of the other variable. Therefore I 
am rejecting the H8 at group-level as well. 
5.2.1 Summary and main findings 
Throughout this chapter I have assessed the importance of horizontal inequality, both 
economic and political on terrorism. Through different operationalizations of the 
dependent variable and on different levels of analysis, the political exclusion variable 
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holds strong, while the results for the economic inequality variables are somewhat more 
uncertain. Table 5.4 shows all hypotheses and whether or not they are supported 
throughout my analysis. The results from the models show that both on the country-
level, when analyzing which country-specific factors that apply for explaining levels and 
overall probability of terrorism, the political exclusion variable holds. Taking this 
knowledge further down at the ethnic group-level the findings from the cross-country 
analysis are confirmed. By testing the hypotheses at the ethnic group-level, something 
that has not been done before, I have been able to test the causal-mechanism proposed 
directly on politically relevant ethnic groups, and the results seem to confirm my 
assumptions.  
The strong and robust effects of the political exclusion variable are somewhat surprising 
because Piazza (2011; 2012) finds in his analysis of both domestic and transnational 
terrorism that economically marginalized groups are the most important explanatory 
variable at the country-level.  In turn his results propose that the ethnic discrimination 
factor together with economic marginalization is the strongest predictor for terrorism. 
Although my results also indicate that there is a relationship at the country and group-
level it is not nearly as strong as the effects he has found in his analyses. This makes me 
tempted to suggest that the strong results stem from his use of MAR variables, which in 
itself may be problematic.  My results do not dispute that there is an effect of economy, 
but rather that this effect is substantially lower than for ethno-political exclusion. In 
Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.1) I have emphasized that the use of MAR may be problematic 
because of the selection on the dependent variable. Using these variables may give us 
results that show stronger effects of the independent variables on the dependent. Østby 
(2011) also emphasizes the questionable quality of the economic inequality variables in 
MAR, which are basically collected by asking group leaders about their status. This may 
again yield biased results as some leaders may be tempted to report that their economic 
situation is weaker than it really is: 
For each type of grievance, the HIGHEST level of grievance expressed by group 
representatives is reported(…)Values are based on statements and actions by group 
leaders and members or observations of grievances by third parties (MAR, 2009:14). 
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As my economic variables are calculated by looking at geographical GDP per capita 
levels, and then combining this with information on settlement patterns, the variables in 
itself may be less biased.  This may be one of the reasons why my results are weaker 
than those found by Piazza (2011; 2012) at the country-level.  
Poor individuals vs. poor groups 
Despite the claims to the contrary, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict also seems to confirm 
that poverty reinforces motivations for terrorism. Living standards among Palestinians 
in Gaza are only a small faction (less than 12 per cent) of that in Israel, as many as 84.6 
percent of Palestinians in Gaza and 57.8 percent in the West Bank live below the poverty 
line (Lia & Skjølberg, 2004:33). 
Palestine serves as a good example on ethno-nationalist terrorism, but it is also worth 
noting that this case is specifically complex. My results indicate that the effect of 
economic marginalization and terrorism (e.g. being poor) is stronger when tested 
directly at the group level.  Relating this to previous studies of terrorism, it seems that 
the group-level may be more appropriate when explaining economic inequality. As 
discussed in Chapter 2; the findings from the individual level negates that there is a 
deprivation effect of being poor on participation in terrorist organizations (Krueger & 
Malekova, 2003; Krueger, 2007; 2008; Berrebi, 2007).  These results may therefore 
indicate that personal grievance (e.g. at the individual level) connected to being poor, is 
not as strong as being part of a poor group (hence Krueger’s “Robin-Hood Paradox”). 
The relationship between economic marginalization at the individual level and the 
group-level seems to follow in line with what Krueger (2007) proposes. This might 
support the notion that individuals operate on behalf of a larger (ethnic) group. The 
proxy for highly economically marginalized ethnic groups (at the country-level) is not 
robust, and it is therefore reason to believe that the effect is stronger for ethno-
nationalist terrorism, than on the overall measurement of domestic terrorism. This 
indicates that the causal mechanisms may be different for different types of terrorism 
(e.g. motivations).  
Focusing on the political HI aspect in the disaggregated analysis leaves me with much 
more confidence. The power-balance variable is also interesting as my starting point 
was that weaker groups would have more to gain from using terrorist measures, and 
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that more powerful groups are able to use higher intensity measures (such as civil war) 
rather than using terrorism. In Cederman et al. (2011) power-balance is positively 
related to ethno-nationalist civil war at intermediate levels, this thus makes my point 
even stronger, as groups would turn to higher intensity measures as their power rises. 
This line of argumentation is relevant in regard to the PLO in Palestine, and might be 
prescribed to other groups as well: 
It is also instructive that when the PLO was at its weakest it chose to use terrorism, but 
once it had gained political leverage it was in a position to dispense with it. As a 
consequence it is not surprising that the PLO became a model for other ethnic and 
nationalist groups in other areas that sought to improve their situation or achieve 
independence (Lutz & Lutz, 2005:110-111).   
Taking a short look at my control variables another intriguing finding from my group-
level analysis is the strong negative effect of the number of excluded groups in the 
country. As we see from the models, and from Figure 7 the probability of terrorism 
steadily decreases the more groups a country exhibits. This thus verifies the argument 
that groups do not take up arms if the government use hard-line measures against 
rebellion, and are unlikely to accept concessions from the group (Walter, 2006). The 
democracy and anocracy variables are highly significant and positively connected to 
terrorism throughout all model specifications. Groups residing in open societies and in 
semi-democracies seem to have higher probability of using terrorism; this is for example 
the case for the Basques in Spain and in India. 
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Table 5: Summary of hypotheses 
*The effect of excluded group variable was significant using the logit model, but not when testing it at 
rates of terrorism. **The negative horizontal inequality variable was weak but significant in Model 8. 
 
  
 
Supported  
Partly 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Horizontal Inequalities Country-level 
   
    H1:  The rates and probability of terrorism increases in 
countries with at least one excluded ethnic group. 
 
X* 
 H2:   The rates and probability of terrorism increases in 
countries with severe political horizontal inequities. X 
  H3a:   The rates and probability of terrorism increases 
in countries with large income gap between the 
economic average and the poorest group. 
 
X** 
 H3b: The rates and probability of terrorism increases in 
countries with large income gap between the economic 
average and the richest group. 
  
X 
H4:  The rates and probability of terrorism increases in 
countries with both political and economic horizontal 
inequalities 
  
X 
    Horizontal Inequalities at Group-level  
   
    H5:  Politically excluded ethnic groups are more likely 
to use terrorism, than included groups X 
  H6:  Ethnic groups far from the income average have 
higher probability of using terrorism than groups at the 
income average 
  
X 
H7a:  Poor ethnic groups are more likely to engage in 
terrorism than the groups at the income average.  X 
  H7b:  Rich ethnic groups have higher probability of 
using terrorism than the groups at the income average. 
  
X 
H8:  Ethnic groups experiencing both political and 
economic HIs have higher probability of using 
terrorism. 
  
X 
82 
 
  
83 
 
6.  Discussion and conclusion  
Terrorism is a security problem facing the world today, and policymakers are trying to 
find the best measures to counter the threat from terrorism. Terrorist groups are 
committing horrible actions, with different motivations, these being among others from 
a revolutionary, separatist, or religious standpoint. Throughout the world terrorist 
organizations’ main goal is political change, by instilling fear in the population. Ethno-
nationalist terrorism is not only affecting the host country, but also creating regional 
instability. Countries like India, Myanmar, Turkey and Iran are frequently experiencing 
terrorism by ethnic groups wanting to enhance their situation. As we have seen ethnic 
tensions (and terrorism) in Mali has gotten both regional and international 
consequences.  
The main goal of this thesis has been to investigate how structural inequalities (HIs) 
increase the risk of ethno-nationalist terrorism in countries around the world. That is, 
how these inequalities is a main factor in producing frustration for ethnic groups. As we 
have seen, previous studies of terrorism have had a focus on the individuals being part 
of the terrorist organizations, and they have not taken into account the fact that groups 
are the main perpetrators.  
Throughout this thesis I have looked more closely at ethno-nationalist terrorism, and 
the drivers for this specific sub-type of terrorism. What I have shown through my 
analysis is that horizontal inequalities are apt to explain both country- and group-level 
variations. The analyses I have presented show that countries with severe political 
inequality, and in some part economic inequality in fact have higher probability of 
experiencing terrorism. If we want to say something about levels or the severity of 
terrorism the political exclusion of groups also holds strong as a predictor. In relation to 
the economic factors, the results are not supportive for higher frequency of terrorism. 
The next step and maybe the most important contribution of my thesis were to look 
more specifically at the group-level of analysis. This enabled me to “drill down” and test 
more directly the causal logic behind the argument; that inequality between groups is 
driving them to use terrorism. The analysis at the group-level confirms the findings from 
the country-level analysis; groups experiencing strong political marginalization have 
higher probability of using terrorism.  
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As we have seen the results are strong for political inequality, but not as robust for the 
economic marginalization approach. This is lending a reasonable amount of support to 
the hypothesis that terrorist groups are motivated by political grievance, rather than the 
pursuit of economic goals, which is a highly disputed hypothesis among scholars of the 
field. As Krueger (2007) mentions, Westerners look at the world through materialist 
eyes, and thus relates frustration to the lack of material and economic opportunities. 
Following this, my results show that the political grievances connected to strong 
marginalization is of greater importance when we want to explain why ethnic groups 
use terrorism.  
In this thesis I have uncovered that the exclusive focus on the country-level could be 
misleading as aggregated data might be masking important factors of the terrorist 
phenomenon. Research on specific types of terrorism is an important contribution to the 
study of terrorism. The causes of terrorism vary widely in between the different types of 
terrorism, and the research to date has not been able to conclude on the factors causing 
groups/individuals to use terrorism. One of the most apparent reasons for this is the 
tendency of supposing that all strains of terrorism have the same underlying causal 
mechanisms.  
6.1 Added Value and policy implications 
... It’s not that I’m apologetic. It’s just a matter of sanity. If you don’t care if there are 
further terrorist attacks, then fine, say let’s not pay attention to the reasons. If you’re 
interested in preventing them, of course you’ll pay attention to the reasons. It has 
nothing to do with apologetics (Chomsky, 2011[2003]:15) 
To conduct productive counter-terrorism policies we need to have in-depth as well as 
broad knowledge about what causes and motivates terrorist activity. Governments 
should therefore support research on different sides of the terrorist phenomenon.  
This thesis has added value to the study of terrorism in several ways. The most 
important contribution is the new disaggregated data, which makes it possible to 
analyse ethnic groups and group-dynamics at a sub-national levels. The combination of 
GTD data and EPR also give ample opportunities of using geo-referenced variables, 
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which is a step in the right direction. Further, I have also given new insights to the 
inequality-terrorism literature, and the deprivation approach. I have combined 
knowledge from different parts of the study of political violence, proposing that 
terrorism research has a lot to gain by looking at the civil war literature and integrating 
knowledge over research “barriers”. This has made it possible to enhance the knowledge 
from previous research.  
Is it possible to generalize my finding to other types of terrorism? What is important to 
remember is that my data and analyses are able to give information on ethno-nationalist 
terrorism alone and the results proposed in this thesis are only prescribed to this 
specific form of terrorism. But it is also highly reasonable to expect that my argument 
can be prescribed to other terrorist groups and organizations as well.  Basically, one 
might say that economic factors are fundamental for ideological terrorism as well. When 
looking at ideological terrorism, both right-wing (racist) and left-wing, the horizontal 
inequality aspect might be important. It is also in some cases possible to connect this 
understanding to transnational terrorism. Lia (2005) points to this fact: 
It is likely that the emerging pattern of horizontal inequality in Europe, especially with 
regard to the growing Muslim Diasporas, may cause a trend towards a more home-grown 
jihadism (Lia, 2005:104). 
 Lia (2005) also propose that the multidimensionality of inequality may lead to more 
domestic terrorism in Western-Europe as the distribution of wealth (among immigrant 
communities) may lead to more anti-immigration and racist violence. What is evident 
from this is that it is highly possible that my results also have implications for the 
understanding of other types of terrorist activity.  
Last but not least, my new disaggregated approach has made it possible to test different 
geographically based variables, which makes it possible to directly test relationships at 
the group-level. In this way my new data material also opens a lot of new possibilities 
for further research. It might be interesting to investigate the groups’ opportunities in 
regard to oil reserves, or availability of other natural resources, and then again adding 
value to the debate on opportunity vs. grievance. It would also be interesting to uncover 
more on the relationship between civil war and terrorism.  
86 
 
In the end, what is most evident to me is that the research field needs to be taking all 
levels of analysis into consideration. All three; the individuals, the groups and the 
countries are all providing information on different aspects of the phenomenon. 
Knowledge on all three levels is vital if we want to explain and get ahead with the 
research. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1: List over ethnic groups and groups from the GTD  
Country Group GTD Ethnic Group 
EPR 
Afghanistan     Taliban Pashtuns 
Angola   FLEC/PLMC/FELC-FAC Cabindan 
Mayombe 
Angola   UNITA Ovimbundu-
Ovambo 
Armenia  Armenian Guerilla Armenians 
Azerbaijan  Armenian Guerilla Armenians 
Bangladesh Jamaat-E-Islami/BNP/JMB/Muslim Militants/Muslim 
fundamentalists/Muslim demonstrators 
Bengali Muslims 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina     
Moslem Paramilitary Group Bosniaks/Muslims 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina     
Croats Croats 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina     
Serbian guerrillas/Bosnian Serbs Serbs 
Brazil Amazonas Liberation Front /Guajajara Tribe /Krikapi Tribe/Pareci 
Indians/Guayacaipuro Tribe/Kaingang Indians 
Indigenous 
peoples 
Bulgaria      Turks Turkish 
Burundi   Hutus/PALIPE Hutu 
Burundi   Tutsi Tutsi 
Canada FLQ/Qbec Separatists French Speakers 
Chad Zaghawa ethnic group Zaghwa, Bideyat 
China Koreans Koreans 
China      Uighur Separatists Uyghur 
   
Croatia  Serbian Militants/Serbian Guirillas Serbs 
Cyprus  CTPM Turks 
Cyprus  EOKA Greeks 
DRC Banyamulenge rebels/Tutsi Tutsi-
Banyamulenge 
Djibouti    Afar Rebels Afar 
Ecuador        Ashuar tribe Indigenous 
peoples 
Egypt     Musim Fundamentalists/Muslim Militants/IG Arab Muslims 
Eritrea   Nomadic Afars Afar 
Ethiopia TPLF Tigry 
Ethiopia ELF Muslim Eritreans 
Ethiopia  Amhara 
Ethiopia ONLF Somali (Ogaden) 
Ethiopia OLF Oroma 
France FLNC/Corsican Separatists/Corsican Revolutionary Brigade Corsicans 
France ETA/Basc Rectitudes/IK/BBE Basques 
   
Georgia     Georgian Militants/Georgian guerillia/ Georgians 
Georgia     South Ossetian Separatists Ossetians (South) 
Georgia     Abkhazian Separatists Abkhazians 
India    Mizo National Front Mizo 
India    Peoples Liberation Army Manipuri 
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India    Tamils/LTTE/Tamil Liberation Army Tamil (non-
SC/ST) 
India    GNLF/BTF Bengali (non-
SC/ST) 
India    BTHK/Khalistan Commando Force/Khalistan Liberation 
Force/Akali Dal  Party/Diminish Regiment 
Punjabi-Sikhs 
(non-
SC/ST/OBCs) 
India    Hindu Group/VHP/Bihar Peoples Party Hindi (Non 
SC/ST/OBCs) 
India    NLFT/ATTF/TNV Indigenous 
Tripuri 
India    HM/JeM/Kashmiri Militants/LeT/LeJ Kashmiri Muslims 
India    Naga People/NSCN/NSCN-IM/NSCN-K Naga 
India    Bodo Militants/BLT/NDFB Bodo 
India    ULFA Assamese (non-
SC/ST/OBCs) 
Indonesia       HKBP Bataks 
Indonesia       E. Timoreese Youts/E. T.Activists/Timoreese guirillas East Timorese 
Indonesia       GAM Achinese 
Indonesia       OPM Papua 
 Iran Arab separatists/Arabs/Autonomy seeking Arabs Arabs 
 Iran ASALA Armenians 
 Iran Jundallah Baloch 
 Iran Kurdish Rebels/Kurdish guerillas/Kurdish Oppositionists/KDP Kurds 
Iraq Kurds/UKSP/KNU/KPG/PUK/PKK/KDP Kurds 
Iraq Al-Qa'ida /Al-Qa'ida in Iraq Sunni Arabs 
Israel      Palestinians/PLF/al-Fatha/PLO/PLFP/DFLP/PIJ/Hamas/PRC/Al-
Aqsa Martyrs Brigade/Popular resistance committees 
Palestinian Arabs 
Italy  German Speaking Separatists/Tyrol separatists German speakers 
(Austrians) 
 Jordan   PLO/PFLP/IFLP Palestinian Arabs 
Kazakhstan     Uighur Liberation Organization Uighur 
Kenya  Nandi-Tribe/Maasai tribe Kalenjin-Masai-
Turkana-Samburu 
  Lebanon    Shaykh Subhi Al-Salih Forces Sunnis (Arab) 
  Lebanon    Druzes Druze 
  Lebanon    PLO/Palestinians/OAPY Palestinians 
(Arab) 
  Lebanon    Shiite Muslims/Sons of the South/Amal/Al-Sadr 
Brigades/Hizballah 
Shi'a Muslims 
(Arab 
Macedonia KLA/NLA/ARI Albanians 
 Mali   Black Malian Group Blacks (Mande, 
Peul, Voltaic etc.) 
 Mali   Tuaregs /Tuareg Guirilla Tuareg 
Mauritania      Polisario Front Sahrawis 
Mexico          Zapatista National Army Indigenous 
peoples 
Moldova Russian Militia/dnsestr Republic searatists/Russian Separatists Russian speakers 
Morocco        Polisaro Front Sahrawis 
Myanmar   Naga People Indians 
Myanmar   Shan Insurgents/SURA/Shan State Army Shan 
Myanmar   Mon Guirillia Mons 
Myanmar   Buddhist Monks Buddhist 
Arakanese 
Myanmar   Kachin Insurgents Kachins 
 Myanmar Karen National Union/Karen Insurgents/Karenni National 
Progressive Party 
Kayin (Karens) 
Nepal United Peoples Front Dalits both Hill & 
Tarai 
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Nepal       JTMM/MMT/MPRF Madhesi 
   New 
Zealand   
Maori Maori 
  Nicaragua    Misurasata Indian Organization/Miskito Indian Organization Miskitos 
Niger  Tuaregs /Tuareg Guirilla/MNJ Tuareg 
 Nigeria   Igbo tribal Group Igbo 
 Nigeria   NDPVF/NDV/MEND/NDDF Ijaw 
Pakistan  PPP/Sindhi Nationalists Sindhi 
Pakistan  MNM/MQM Mohajirs 
Pakistan  Taliban Pashtuns 
Pakistan  BLA/BRA/BLF Baluchis 
Philippines      MNLF/MILF/ASG Moro 
 Russia    Congress of Kabardian People Kabardins 
 Russia    Chechen Rebels/Chechen Lone Wolf Group/Chechen 
Martyrs/EFCRI 
Chechens 
Rwanda  Tutsis Tutsi 
Rwanda  Hutus Hutu 
Senegal  MDFC/Dioulas tribal group/Casamance separatists Diola 
South Africa  Inkatha Freedom Party Zulu 
Spain FAC/Terra Lliure Catalans 
Spain Free Galacian People's Guirilla Army Galacians 
Spain ETA Basques 
Sri Lanka                   Tamils/LTTE/Tamil Liberation Army Sri Lankan Tamils 
Sri Lanka                             Sinhaleese Extremism Sinhalese 
Syria    PKK Kurds 
Thailand PULO/Muslim Separatists/ Muslim Militants/Thai Islamic Militants Malay Muslims 
 Turkey  PKK/ Kurdish Separatists/Kurds/ PUK/Kurdish rebels Kurds 
United 
Kingdom    
SNLA/Scottish Nationalists/AFS Scots 
United 
Kingdom    
IRA/INLA/RIRA/OIRA/Irish Republican Exstremists/CIRA/ Catholics In N. 
Ireland 
United 
Kingdom    
UVF/UFF/Protestant Extremists/LVF/OV Protestants In N. 
Ireland 
United States 
of America    
Black Liberation Army /Black Panters African Americans 
United States 
of America    
American Indian Movement American Indians 
Yugoslavia  Croatian Nationalists/Croatians Croats 
Yugoslavia  Serbs/Serbian Guirilla/Serbian Rebels/ Serbs 
Yugoslavia  KLA/Albanians/Albanian Separatists Albanians 
Zimbabwe ZAPU/Supporters of Joshua Nkomo Ndebele 
Zimbabwe ZANU Shona 
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Table A2: Abbreviations to table A1 
 
  
 PLMC=popular Movement for the liberation of Angola  NSCN-IM=National Socialist Council of NagalandIsak-Muivah 
FLEC=Cabida Armed Forces PLF=Palestine Liberation front 
FELC-FAC= Front for the liberation of cambinda /Cabinda Armed Forces  NSCN-K=National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang 
BNP=Bangladesh Nationalist party  IFLP=Islamic Front for the Liberation of Palestine  
JMB=Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh PFLP=Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
PALIPE= Party for the Liberation of Hutu People DFLP=Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine  
FLQ=Front de Liberation du Qubec PJI=Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
CTPM=  Cyprus Turkish People's Movement  PDP=Kurdish Democratic Party-Iraq  
EOKA= National Organization of Cypriot Figthers OAPY=Organization of avenging Palestinian Youth  
IG=al-Gama'at al-Islamiyva PKK=Kurdistan Workers Party 
TPLF= Tigray Peoples Liberation Front PUK=Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
ELF= Eritrean Liberation Front  KPG=Kurdish Peshmerga Guerillas 
ONLF=Ogaden National Liberation Front JTMM=Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha 
OLF=Oromoro Liberation Front  KPG=Kurdish Peshmerga Guerillas 
TNV=Tripura National Volenteers MPRF= Madhesi Peoples' Right Forum  
ETA= Basque Fatherland and Freedom MNJ=Movement of Niger People  
BBE= Spanish Basque Batillion  NDPVF=Niger Delta Peoples' Voulenteer Force 
IK=Iparretarrak NDV=Niger Delta Vigilante 
LeT=Laskar-e-Taiba MEND=Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
JeM= Janish-e-Mohammad NDDF=Niger Delta Freedom Figthers   
ATTF=All Tripura Tiger Force MNLF=Moro National Libration Front  
GNLF=Gurkha National Liberation Front EFCRI=Armed Forces of the chechen Republic and Ichekeria  
LTTE=Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam MILF=Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
BTF=Bengali Tiger Force MDFC=Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance  
BTHK=Bhinderanwale Tiger Force of Khalistan FAC= Catalan Liberation Front  
VHP=Vishwa Hindu Parishad RIRA= Real Irish Republican Army   
NLFT=National Liberation Front Tripura CIRA= Continuity Irish Republican Army  
HM=Hizbul Muhajideen OV= Orange Voulenteers  
NSCN=National Socialist Council of Nagaland LVF= Loyalist Voulenteer Forces 
BLT=Bodo Liberatio Tigers PUK=Patriotic Union of Kurdisthan  
ULFA=United Liberation Front of Assam  SNLA=Scottish National Liberation Army  
HKBP=Huria Kristen Batak Protestants INLA= Irish National Liberation Army  
LeJ=Jamiat-ul-Mahammad UVF= Ulster Voluenteer Force 
GAM=Free Acheh Movement AFS=Army for Freeing Scoland  
OPM=Free Papua Movement  OIRA=Official Irish Republican Army 
NDFB=National Democratic Gront og Bodoland IPLO= Irish People's Liberation Organization 
ASLA= Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia  UFF= Ulster Freedom fighters 
KDP=Kurdish Democratic Party-Iran  ZAPU= Zimbabwe African People's Union  
PKK= Kurdish Workers Party  ZANU= Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union 
UKSP=Unified Kurdish Socialist Party FLNC= Corsican National Liberation Front  
ASG= Abu Sayyaf Group  PLO= Palestine Liberation Organization  
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Appendix B 
Here I will present some models and analyses supplementary to the models in Chapter 5.  
I have not included all tests and models, only those most vital to my analysis. The 
majority of the models will not be discussed in detail.  
Test for multicorrelation at country-level 
The vif test show that none of my independent variables have to high tolerance levels. 
The critical level of the vif test is 0.2-0.1, with perfect multicollinearity the tolerance 
equals zero (Hamilton, 1992). Although we see that the controls for time-dependence 
are highly correlated, which is not surprising.  
Table B1: VIF-test at country-level 
Largest excluded group  0.874007 
Positive horizontal inequality 0.854022 
Negative horizontal inequality  0.761424 
Anocracy  0.777881 
Democracy  0.572089 
Population  0.536650 
Area  0.555546 
GDP per capita 0.668364 
Time since last terror attack  0.018596 
_spline1  0.024595 
_spline2 0.000654 
_spline3 0.000711 
 
SURA= Shan United Revolutionary Army  PULO= Pattani United Liberation Organization 
NLA=National Liberatin Army 
KLA= Kosovo Liberation Army  
ARI= Army of the Republic of Ilidra 
ETA= Basque Fatherland and Freedom 
 UNITA= National Union for the Total Independence of Angola  
 
MNM= Mohajir National Movement  
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Model fit Zero-Inflated Negative Binominal Model  
The choice of using the zero-inflated negative binominal model is based on the fact that 
the zeroes in the terrorism data may be prescribed to two different mechanisms. First, 
we might have countries that (theoretically) do not experience terrorism by default. 
Second, the zeroes may stem from underreporting bias (Li, 2005; Drakos & Gofas, 
2006a; 2006b). The choice to inflate all variables in the inflation model, is somewhat 
disputed. Drakos & Gofas (2006a) and Li (2005) cast doubt on this approach, while 
Findly, Piazza & Young (2012) and Piazza (2011) specifies the model with all variables 
included and conclude that this approach is reasonable as the results do not vary 
substantially. Based on my model-fit test, and sensitivity analyses using only the polity-
variable (democracy) in the inflate model, the results do not change notably. I therefore 
keep the model with all variables, but keeping in mind that the model have its 
shortcomings when used on the terrorism data. See Table B2. 
Based on Model 4 in Chapter 5 I  run tests  to see if the zinb model fits the data better 
than the nbreg model. So Figure 1 shows a graph comparing the predictions of zero from 
both models at different counts. We se that the zinb model clearly underpredicts zeroes 
at counts lower than 2. Both at higher levels (counts over 3) the two models clearly 
show the same predictions. Although it looks like we should prefere the nbreg model 
over the zinb model (at least at lower counts) we cannot base the choice of model by 
only looking at the graph. The other test statistics (Voung test, the BIC and AIC )clearly 
prefere the zinb over nbreg.  
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Table B2: Model testing different operationalisations of the inflated-equation 
 
  
 
Model 15 
Original 
Model 16 
Democracy  
Model 17 
Polity2  
    Count Model (non-certain zero) 
   Excluded 
   
    LEG 1.997* 2.177** 2.422** 
 
(1.117) (0.945) (0.960) 
NHI -0.445*** -0.367*** -0.336*** 
 
(0.105) (0.112) (0.118) 
PHI 0.192 0.573 0.531 
 
(0.231) (0.539) (0.471) 
Anocracy 0.614* 1.090*** 0.648* 
 
(0.352) (0.297) (0.346) 
Democracy 0.569 0.529 0.236 
 
(0.452) (0.419) (0.431) 
Population 0.575*** 0.884*** 0.889*** 
 
(0.176) (0.145) (0.145) 
Area -0.225 -0.338* -0.373** 
 
(0.203) (0.180) (0.183) 
GDP 0.308 0.322* 0.321* 
 
(0.213) (0.179) (0.173) 
Constant 2.660 2.348 3.090 
 
(2.150) (2.054) (2.090) 
Inflated Logit (certain zero) 
   Excluded 
   
    LEG -0.220 
  
 
(0.974) 
  PHI -1.221 
  
 
(0.814) 
  NHI -3.746*** 
  
 
(1.240) 
  Anocracy -2.051*** -22.60*** 
 
 
(0.600) (0.629) 
 Democracy -1.273*** 
  
 
(0.414) 
  Polity2 
   
-0.372*** 
    
(0.0785) 
Population -0.854*** 
  
 
(0.208) 
  Area 0.290* 
  
 
(0.153) 
  GDP -0.213 
  
 
(0.240) 
  Constant 4.021** -1.312** -3.001*** 
 
(2.045) (0.521) (0.580) 
Observations 4,647 4502 4502 
Nonzero Observations 1715 1674 1674 
Zero Observations 2932 2828 2828 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure B1:Model fit analysis 
 
Table B3 shows models 18 to 21, which are the models 1 to 4 presented in Chapter 5. 
Here I have used a negative binominal regression model. As also mentioned in the 
model-fit discussion, the nbreg model does not account for the excess number of zeroes 
in the models. What is evident when running the nreg model is that the results are not 
robust. Looking at the regressions of the same models (1-4) shows large deviations from 
the zero-inflated model, and the results are overall more significant. Thus my data fits 
better with the zero-inflated model as this controlls for the excessive amount of zero 
observations in the data.  
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Table B3: Models run with a negative binominal model 
  Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21  
     Excluded 1.107** 
   
 
(0.454) 
   
Largest excluded group 
 
1.787** 
 
1.950** 
  
(0.874) 
 
(0.857) 
Richest group 
  
-0.325*** -0.368*** 
   
(0.122) (0.112) 
Poor group 
  
0.523 0.540 
   
(0.633) (0.548) 
Anocracy 1.271*** 1.170*** 1.287*** 1.166*** 
 
(0.290) (0.296) (0.281) (0.273) 
Democracy 1.090** 0.802* 0.969** 0.768** 
 
(0.464) (0.419) (0.451) (0.390) 
Population 0.798*** 0.899*** 0.800*** 0.869*** 
 
(0.173) (0.158) (0.171) (0.147) 
Area -0.330** -0.291* -0.204 -0.321* 
 
(0.156) (0.172) (0.174) (0.178) 
GDP per capita 0.263 0.437** 0.278 0.398** 
 
(0.200) (0.191) (0.208) (0.174) 
Constant 2.000 1.663 0.982 1.890 
 
(1.993) (2.007) (1.919) (2.031) 
Observations 4,515 4,647 4,647 4,647 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Logit models country-level 
Table B4 shows the different operationalisations of the original Model 8. Model 22 
shows an interaction effect. Model 23 through 25 shows tests for the outliers in regards 
to the NHI economic inequality variable. Model 27 shows Saudi Arabia which is an 
outlier in the PHI measure.  
Table B4: Logit Model Country-level 
 
Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 
  
without without without without without 
 
Interaction Argentina Russia Thailand Outliers Saudi Arabia 
       LDG 0.601 0.871*** 0.839*** 0.851*** 0.869*** 0.846*** 
 
(0.714) (0.231) (0.231) (0.231) (0.232) (0.229) 
PHI -0.130 -0.0621 -0.0768* -0.0741* -0.0596 -0.0463 
 
(0.124) (0.0396) (0.0395) (0.0392) (0.0403) (0.136) 
NHI 0.190* 0.138 0.291** 0.176* 0.134 0.171 
 
(0.111) (0.0909) (0.117) (0.105) (0.0950) (0.106) 
Anocracy 0.745*** 0.753*** 0.723*** 0.753*** 0.765*** 0.738*** 
 
(0.137) (0.137) (0.135) (0.136) (0.137) (0.136) 
Democracy 0.598*** 0.618*** 0.579*** 0.595*** 0.616*** 0.594*** 
 
(0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.133) (0.135) (0.132) 
Population 0.423*** 0.431*** 0.415*** 0.422*** 0.430*** 0.420*** 
 
(0.0577) (0.0578) (0.0580) (0.0579) (0.0578) (0.0577) 
Area -0.127*** -0.132*** -0.124*** -0.126*** -0.131*** -0.126*** 
 
(0.0441) (0.0441) (0.0441) (0.0441) (0.0442) (0.0437) 
GDP 0.172*** 0.166*** 0.175*** 0.170*** 0.165*** 0.173*** 
 
(0.0547) (0.0551) (0.0546) (0.0549) (0.0551) (0.0552) 
PHI*LEG 0.286 
     
 
(0.621) 
     NHI*LEG -0.0799 
     
 
(0.407) 
     GTD_peace -0.917*** -0.908*** -0.908*** -0.915*** -0.905*** -0.919*** 
 
(0.0612) (0.0611) (0.0608) (0.0617) (0.0614) (0.0616) 
_spline1 -6.27e-07 1.44e-06 2.71e-06 4.27e-06 6.37e-06 -1.23e-06 
 
(9.66e-05) (9.63e-05) (9.69e-05) (9.67e-05) (9.67e-05) (9.70e-05) 
_spline2 -0.0341*** -0.0337*** -0.0336*** -0.0339*** -0.0334*** -0.0341*** 
 
(0.00394) (0.00394) (0.00394) (0.00396) (0.00396) (0.00397) 
_spline3 0.00993*** 0.00981*** 0.00975*** 0.00985*** 0.00971*** 0.00994*** 
 
(0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00154) 
Constant 0.122 0.134 -0.0658 0.0697 0.130 0.0547 
 
(0.506) (0.485) (0.490) (0.484) (0.484) (0.496) 
       Observations 4.647 4.611 4.611 4.611 4.575 4,611 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Group-level tests 
Test for multicollinearity at the group-level 
As for the VIF-test at the country level, it does not seem that any of my independent 
variables have to low of a tolerance. But we see that the power balance variable have a 
low level of tolerance. This is probably not of any importance, as the variable is 
calculated with information from the groupsize variable. 
Table B5: VIF- test country-level 
Excluded 0.616129 
Power balance  0.215805 
Poor ethnic group  0.795275 
Rich ethnic group  0.962025 
Anocracy  0.777111 
Democracy  0.600737 
Number of excluded groups  0.596599 
GDP per capita 0.723978 
Groupsize  0.207631 
Time since last terror attack by ethnic 
group  0.003277 
_spline1  0.000069 
_spline2  0.000064 
_spline3  0.001627 
Logit models group-level 
Table B6 shows models 28 to 31 based on Model 14 in Chapter 5 and show different 
restrictions to the sample. These models are without the outliers in the Poor ethnic 
group variable.  Model 28 show a regression for only the years after 1990 (because of 
the static nature of the G-Econ variable). 
In table B7 shows models 32 to 34. Model 33 shows a model where excluded group is 
swapped with a variable measuring discrimination. Being discriminated means that a 
group is simultaneously excluded from central power, and experiencing discriminatory 
policies (Cederman et al., 2011). One would believe that being discriminated would have 
a larger effect on terrorism than “just” being excluded.  As we see the discriminated 
variable is significant, but not nearly as strong as the excluded variable (Model 14). This 
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is an interesting observation as it seems that (again) exclusion politics matter most in 
regard to ethno-nationalist terrorism.  
Table B6: Logit models group-level 
  
Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 
 
 
without without without without 
  
Russia Thailand Argentina outliers 
      
      Excluded 
 
1.462*** 1.470*** 1.488*** 1.488*** 
  
(0.286) (0.291) (0.290) (0.290) 
Power balance -1.543** -1.418* -1.364* 
 
  
(0.776) (0.731) (0.715) 
 Poor group 
 
0.372 0.558** 0.641** -1.394* 
  
(0.270) (0.259) (0.275) (0.718) 
Rich group 
 
-0.185 -0.167 -0.155 0.638** 
  
(0.218) (0.206) (0.201) (0.276) 
Anocracy 
 
0.421* 0.340 0.353 -0.159 
  
(0.230) (0.231) (0.235) (0.202) 
Democracy 
 
0.779*** 0.757*** 0.784*** 0.341 
  
(0.225) (0.228) (0.227) (0.234) 
No.excluded groups -0.0581*** -0.0983*** -0.104*** 0.768*** 
  
(0.0132) (0.0244) (0.0279) (0.228) 
GDP per capita 0.245** 0.196 0.186 -0.104*** 
  
(0.112) (0.122) (0.119) (0.0278) 
Groupsize 
 
1.655 1.530 1.474 0.188 
  
(1.201) (1.161) (1.148) (0.118) 
GTD_peace 
 
-0.485*** -0.476*** -0.476*** 1.515 
  
(0.0877) (0.0885) (0.0902) (1.157) 
_spline1 
 
0.00641 0.00747 0.00890 0.00890 
  
(0.00768) (0.00782) (0.00817) (0.00818) 
_spline2 
 
-0.00661* -0.00715** -0.00792** -0.00792** 
  
(0.00345) (0.00353) (0.00369) (0.00370) 
_spline3 
 
0.00255*** 0.00269*** 0.00288*** 0.00288*** 
  
(0.000721) (0.000746) (0.000774) (0.000775) 
Constant 
 
-4.815*** -4.501*** -4.515*** -4.510*** 
  
(0.914) (0.915) (0.895) (0.891) 
Observations 14526 16146 16062 15922 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table B7: Logit models group-level 
 
 
Model 32 Model 33 Model 34 
 
Year> 1990 Discriminated Interactions 
 
      
    Excluded 1.084*** 
 
1.350 
 
(0.310) 
 
(1.130) 
Discriminated 0.720* 
 
  
(0.401) 
 Power balance -1.400 -1.560** -1.459** 
 
(1.073) (0.681) (0.715) 
Poor group 0.762** 0.620** -0.242 
 
(0.296) (0.255) (0.464) 
Rich group -0.265 -0.284 0.420 
 
(0.342) (0.277) (0.608) 
Anocracy -0.139 0.225 0.333 
 
(0.239) (0.258) (0.230) 
Democracy 0.235 0.616** 0.725*** 
 
(0.306) (0.267) (0.220) 
No.excluded groups -0.110*** -0.0863*** -0.101*** 
 
(0.0288) (0.0268) (0.0255) 
GDP per capita 0.0649 0.296** 0.198 
 
(0.146) (0.130) (0.123) 
Groupsize 1.895 0.445 1.510 
 
(1.596) (1.189) (1.141) 
Rich*excluded 
 
-0.743 
   
(0.694) 
Poor*excluded 
 
0.833 
   
(0.548) 
GTD_peace -0.264* -0.414*** -0.475*** 
 
(0.141) (0.0835) (0.0902) 
_spline1 0.0255** 0.0109 0.00763 
 
(0.0123) (0.00791) (0.00788) 
_spline2 -0.0153*** -0.00836** -0.00722** 
 
(0.00544) (0.00359) (0.00355) 
_spline3 0.00439*** 0.00279*** 0.00270*** 
 
(0.00111) (0.000755) (0.000746) 
Constant -2.896** -4.258*** -4.241*** 
 
(1.227) (0.958) (1.115) 
Observations 6,896 16,181 16,181 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
  
  
